How Private Is Your Voting? A Framework for Comparing the Privacy of
  Voting Mechanisms by Liu, Ao et al.
How Private Is Your Voting? A Framework for Comparing the
Privacy of Voting Mechanisms
Ao Liu∗, Yun Lu∗∗, Lirong Xia†, and Vassilis Zikas††
∗Rensselear Polytechnic Institute, liua6@rpi.edu
∗∗University of Edinburgh, y.lu-59@sms.ed.ac.uk
†Rensselear Polytechnic Institute, xial@cs.rpi.edu
††University of Edinburgh, vzikas@inf.ed.ac.uk
Abstract. Voting privacy has received a lot of attention across several research communities. Tra-
ditionally, the cryptographic literature has focused on how to privately implement/emulate a voting
mechanism. Yet, a number of recent works attempt to capture (and minimize) the amount of informa-
tion one can infer from the output (rather than the implementation) of the voting mechanism. These
works apply differential privacy, in short DP, techniques which noise the outcome to achieve privacy.
This approach intrinsically compromises accuracy, rendering such a voting mechanism unsuitable for
most realistic scenarios.
In this work we address the question of what is the inherent privacy that different voting rules achieve,
without noising the result. To this end we utilize a well accepted notion of noiseless privacy introduced
by Bassily et al. [FOCS 2013] called Distributional Differential Privacy, in short DDP. We argue that
under standard assumptions in the voting literature about the distribution of votes, most natural
mechanisms achieve a satisfactory level of DDP, indicating that noising—and its negative side-effects
for voting—is unnecessary in most cases.
We then put forth a systematic study of noiseless privacy of commonly studied of voting rules, and
compare these rules with respect to their achieved privacy. Note that both DP and DDP induce (possibly
loose) upper bounds on the amount of information that can be inferred, which makes them insufficient
for such a task. To circumvent this, we introduce an exact notion of privacy, which requires the bound
to be exact (i.e. optimal) in a well defined manner. This allows us to order different voting rules with
respect to their achieved privacy. Although motivated by voting, our definitions and techniques can
be generically applied to address the optimality (with respect to privacy) of general mechanisms for
privacy-preserving data release.
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1 Introduction
Privacy-ensuring voting has been extensively studied in the cryptographic literature. The scope of
these works is to enable voters to cast their votes (possibly online) in a manner that ensures that
someone with access to their messages cannot link them to their votes. However, another, equally
important question about voting privacy has received much less attention: How much can someone
infer about your vote by observing information on the outcome released by different mechanisms?
Suppose, for example, you cast a vote in a presidential election indicating your preference over the
candidates. After the election, the winner is announced. What can an (adversarial) observer infer
about your vote if a count of votes that indicate the same preference—i.e., the histogram of votes—
is announced? How about if the number of votes for each candidate in your city is announced? How
about in your building or in your family? Arguably, answering the above privacy-related questions
is highly relevant in practice. For example, minimizing the amount of information leaked by the
information announced by the voting mechanism can help protect against censorship and coercion
and prevent vote buying.
The above questions are closely related to questions about releasing information on a dataset in
a privacy-preserving manner. Indeed, a voting system can be cast as a two-step process: first the
votes (data) are collected by a trusted authority into a database and then a voting rule is applied
on the collected data to announce the outcome. Casting the problem in such a away indicates that
standard methods for protecting the privacy of released data could be also applied to voting for
addressing the above questions.
The most widely accepted such method is differential privacy (in short, DP) [8]. At a high level,
DP bounds the amount of information that a function of a dataset reveals on any record of data.
Informally, for any given database X and any given query f on X, DP requires that no observer
can distinguish the output f(X) from the output f(X ′) of f applied on any neighboring database
X ′–i.e., X ′ is derived from X by removing (or modifying) any given record. The main method for
achieving DP for a given query is by means of a mechanism which noises the outcome of the query,
so that one cannot decide whether or not any individual record was included in computing the
query’s outcome—i.e., the response distribution should be almost the same with or without any
given record.
The privacy level of a DP mechanism is indicated by a scalar  ≥ 0—resulting in what is known
as -DP—which upper bounds the ability of any distinguisher to distinguish between the (noised)
output applied on X and X ′. In order to allow for better DP mechanisms, the above traditional
definition of DP is often extended by another parameter δ ∈ [0, 1] which, informally, bounds the
probability that any privacy guarantee is compromised. This yields the notion of (, δ)-DP [9] 1 In
both these notion, the smaller the  (and δ) the better the corresponding privacy guarantee.
Given its wide adoption as a mechanism for making data release private a number of works has
recently applied DP in voting privacy as a tool for limiting the inference from the output of voting
mechanisms [25,17,20,4]. Alas, as natural as the above idea might seem at first, it has two critical
issues.
First, noising the outcome inherently reduces the accuracy of the output, i.e., introduces a proba-
bility of error, which is unacceptable in many high-stakes situations. To see this, imagine a situation
where candidate A wins by majority, but the mechanism outputs candidate B as the winner, argu-
ing that this is to make the votes more private. And, of course, mechanisms that apply more noise
are more private (i.e., achieve better DP), but they are also less accurate. Thus, these solutions
result in voting mechanisms which might, with some probability that get higher with more privacy,
1 -DP is identical to (, δ)-DP for δ = 0.
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announce a wrong winner; this makes such solutions unusable for most applications. To resolve this
problem, in this work we employ one ([1]) of several distributional notions of differential privacy,
that allow for noiseless mechanisms [3,21,7,1].
The second, and more delicate issue, is that differential privacy puts only an upper bound on the
privacy leakage of a mechanism. In other words, given two -DP mechanisms M1 and M2, one cannot
directly answer which one is more private, as one is often not able to directly use the mechanisms’
DP parameters to compare voting rules—or any other type of mechanisms—with respect to their
privacy. To rectify this, in this work we introduce the notion of exact (distributional) differential
privacy. We note in passing that the question of comparing DP mechanisms with respect to their
utility, has been extensively studied in the related literature [23,5,16,2,12]. However, these works
introduce utility as a function of a mechanism’s accuracy (according some proposed metric) thus
making them insufficient to answer our original question: Given two -DP mechanisms, which one
is the most private?
1.1 Contributions
Motivated by the above voting-privacy questions, we propose a framework for comparing (voting)
mechanisms according to the privacy they provide. To this end, we put forth the notion of exact
privacy. Intuitively, a mechanism is exact private with respect to a set of privacy parameters, if
there are no strictly better parameters that the mechanism can achieve. More concretely, we start
by devising an exact version of -differential privacy (-DP) [8] which we term -exact Differential
Privacy (in short, -eDP). Our notion renders a mechanism -eDP if and only if it satisfies the
following conditions: (1) it is -DP and (2) there exists no ′ <  such that the mechanism is ′-
DP. This definition of exactness is trivially extended to (, δ)-eDP by requiring exactness, as in
Condition 2, above, with respect to both  and δ.
Next, we use exact privacy to answer questions of the type: Given two -DP mechanisms, which
one is preferred? Exact privacy gives a way to answer to this question: prefer the mechanism which
is inherently more private, i.e., achieves better (smaller) exact privacy paramaters. The above
natural question has been approached in the past by introducing explicit utility functions and
using them as a measure of mechanism quality (eg. [23,5,12,16,2].) In fact, exact privacy and utility
turn out not to be completely unrelated quantities. Indeed, we show that a -DP mechanism is
-eDP if it is optimal for some utility function that monotonically increases as privacy deteriorates
(Theorem 4). We exemplify this relationship between exactness and utility by showing that the
α-truncated geometric mechanism—a provably optimal DP mechanism for a natural class of utility
functions [12]—is ln(1/α)-exact DP; to prove this we prove that one of the above class of utilities
is monotonically increasing and apply our theorems. Given that our notion of monotonicity implies
exactness, one might ask whether the converse direction is true: given an -exact DP mechanism
and a monotonically increasing utility function, is the mechanism optimal for this utility? We show
that this is not the case, by analyzing the well known Laplace mechanism [10] which, as we prove
is exact DP, but it is not optimal for a monotonically increasing utility function.
Having defined exact privacy as a notion for comparing differentially private mechanisms, we next
turn to using this notion in voting, and comparing the privacy of different voting rules. We first
observe that, by its nature, noising the outcome of a voting mechanism renders the mechanism
unsuitable for most voting applications. For this reason we resort to distributional differential
privacy (DDP) [1] and extend the notion of exactness to this definition as well, resulting to (, δ)-
eDDP.
Avoiding noising the output does not come for free, as DDP—and any other noiseless privacy
notion—requires assumptions on (1) the distribution from which the data is generated and (2) on
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the auxiliary information the observer/distinguisher has on it. We tackle the first issue by looking
back into our problem, i.e., voting, and employ a standard assumption about the distribution of
votes in the related literature, concretely, that that each row of the database (i.e., each vote) is
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.). In social choice, this is a natural assumption called
impartial culture.
The second issue, i.e., auxiliary information, is more subtle as different auxiliary information triv-
ially affects the privacy of different mechanisms. Hence, to order DDP mechanisms with respect to
their privacy it is necessary to consider them both under the same auxiliary information. The most
objective such information is naturally one which is not correlated with the input distribution or
the output of the mechanism. For this reason, in this work we choose the empty (set) the auxiliary
information.
We remark that, to our knowledge, no prior work has considered applying the idea of DDP on
voting privacy. Therefore, as a sanity check we demonstrate that reasonable DDP parameters can
be proven for (noiseless) voting rules under our assumptions above (Theorem 3). Concretely, we
prove that when database rows are i.i.d., the histogram mechanism (eg. outputting the profile,
which is a histogram of votes) is ( ≥ 2 ln(1 + 1n), δ = exp(−Ω(n[min(2 ln(2), )]2)))-DDP2 for every
database size n. As DDP is immune to post-processing, voting rules which depend only on the
profile also satisfy the same parameters as above.
Having demonstrated that DDP is a well-behaved privacy notion in the context of voting, we dive
into exactness which will allow us to compare different voting rules. Here we are faced with a
multi-parametric problem: Recall that DDP (hence also exact DDP) has two parameters  and
δ which means that the induced ordering if both parameters are left free is a partial order. For
example, the following question has not natural answer: Is ( = 0.1, δ = 0.2) more, or less private
than ( = 0.2, δ = 0.1)?
To avoid incomparable results, we fix one parameter to its optimal value (i.e., 0) and compare
the other. We observe that fixing δ = 0 can yield a notion of (distributional) differential privacy
which is in many cases cannot be instantiated.3 Therefore we choose to fix  = 0 and compare
mechanisms with respect to how good a δ they achieve. We remark that if we would choose  > 0,
then Theorem 3 give us a negligible δ for outputting the histogram of votes—which means that any
mechanism which depends on this histogram (like voting rules) have at most negligible δ. Hence,
by choosing  = 0, we get a much more interesting asymptotic separation of δ values (for example,
Θ
(
1√
n
)
versus negligible in n, as we see in Theorem 6). In addition, the choice  = 0 yields a
nice interpretation of exactness, since δ—which is now the distinguishing advantage of the DDP
experiment—becomes the absolute value of the difference between probability of the mechanism’s
output and the simulator’s output, in other words, their statistical distance.
We use eDDP to order standard voting rules, namely, those in the class of Generalized Scoring Rules
(GSR) [28]. We study the privacy achieved of these mechanisms for two or more (m) candidates,
as the number of votes (n) increases.
We will first study the case when the number of candidates m = 2. We consider the class of
α-majority rules (also called α-biased plurality). For two candidates A and B, the α-majority
winner is A if α fraction of the voters voted for A; otherwise, the winner is B. We note that α-
2 When the database distribution and auxiliary information (which is the empty set for our results) are clear from
context, we sometimes omit them.
3 For example, consider a simple mechanism M which counts the number of x’s in the database, and a database
where one row is fixed to x. Then, it is not possible for M to output a count of 0. When δ is fixed to zero in the
DDP definition, e is the ratio of probabilities of the the mechanisms and the simulators output, both probabilities
conditioned on a database row being fixed to some value. In our example one of these probabilities is zero, so no
finite  can satisfy this ratio. Thus, this simple mechanism does not satisfy (, δ = 0)-DDP for any .
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majority rules cover a wide range of commonly used voting rules for two candidates, including
simple majority/plurality (α = 1/2), supermajority (α > 1/2) and submajority (α < 1/2).
Theorem 1 (Informal, see Theorem 6). Let each vote be iid, and let p be the probability a voter
chooses the first candidate and (1−p) be the probability a voter chooses the second. The mechanism
outputting the α-biased plurality winner is
(
 = 0, δ = Θ
(√
1
n
[( p
α
)α ( 1−p
1−α
)1−α]n))
-eDDP.
The above result highlights a separation of the privacy of the same mechanism, based on the
database distribution. When the bias α is equal to the probability p, then δ = Θ
(
1√
n
)
. Otherwise,
δ is negligible in the database size (number of votes) n.
The analysis of the above uses a new technical tool we introduce, termed the trails technique. The
trails technique can be used to compute (0, δ)-eDDP for mechanisms which depend only on the his-
togram (such as voting rules), and database distributions where rows are independent. To apply this
technique we introduce an alternative definition of DDP which is equivalent to DDP in our setting,
where database rows are independently distributed and the observer has no auxiliary information.
A mechanism M is (, δ)-DDP in the alternative definition if the distributions M(X)|Xi = x and
M(X)|Xi = x′ are (, δ) close.
The idea of the trails techniques is as follows: Since M depends only on the histogram, we can
consider any subset of M’s range S as a subset of histograms that are mapped to S. We can
thus split up computing this distance over any S, into computing over disjoint trails. A trail is
a set of histograms formed the following way: starting with histogram t, subtract one from bin j
and add one to bin k from the previous histogram, and repeat q times. In other words, a set of
the form {t − z · binj + z · bink : 0 ≤ z ≤ q}. The main observation is that when each database
row is independently distributed, for any trail, computing the distance over it cancels all but the
probability of the first and last histogram in the trail. Then, computing (0, δ)-exact DDP is the
same as computing the probabilities of the first and last histograms of a set of trails. We detail this
technique in Section 5. We stress that the trail technique is not restricted to the two candidate case;
in fact the technique is described for the multi-candidate setting and is used also in later sections.
We believe that this technical tool is of independent interest, i.e, relevant for the analysis of exact
privacy of also other mechanisms, beyond just voting.
Next, we consider the number of candidates m ≥ 2. We begin by studying the exact privacy
of outputting an entire histogram of votes, and the privacy of outputting a quantity related to
plurality, the plurality score, which is a histogram of the top-ranked candidate in each vote. To do
so, we show that outputting a histogram of any constant b bins satisfies ( = 0, δ = Θ
(
1√
n
)
)-eDDP
Theorem 7). By setting b = m! for histogram of votes (where m! is the number of linear orders on
m candidates and is constant when m is constant) and b = m for plurality score, we show that
both these mechanisms satisfy
(
 = 0, δ = Θ
(
1√
n
))
-eDDP.
We proceed to present our main two results, which prove the exact privacy of (a large subset of)
GSRs [28]. The subset of GSRs we consider are the voting rules which satisfy the properties of
monotonicity (we note this is not related to monotonically increasing utilities), canceling-out, and
for which there exists a locally stable profile/histogram of votes. In the simple case of two candidates
A and B, these are voting rules whose winner does not change even if one were to add both a vote
for A and for a vote B, or if one were to raise the ranking of the winner in some votes. Moreover, a
locally-stable profile is one where, if we only replace a few of the votes, the winner does not change.
Theorem 2 (Informal, see Theorem 8). For any Generalized Scoring Rule which satisfies the
properties of monotonicity, canceling-out, and for which there exists a locally stable profile, when
each vote is iid:
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1. The mechanism that outputs its winner is
(
 = 0, δ = Θ
(
1√
n
))
-exact DDP, when each vote is
also uniform over the set of linear orders over candidates.
2. There exist database distributions whose Lebesgue measure can be arbitrarily close to 1, where
the mechanism that outputs its winner is ( = 0, δ = O(exp (−Θ(1)n))-DDP.
The above leads to the somewhat surprising conclusion that, when each vote is uniformly dis-
tributed, common voting rules have asymptotically comparable exact privacy δ(n) = Θ
(
1√
n
)
. As
this is the privacy of the histogram mechanism, this means that the uniform distribution induces
the worst case asymptotic privacy for voting rules. Moreover, it shows that for these GSR voting
rules, the privacy differs asymptotically depending on the database distribution.
Finally, we apply our main result by showing a ranking of different voting rules based on concrete δ
values. For each voting rule, we compute the δ values for the mechanism which outputs the winner,
and the distribution where each vote is uniformly distributed. We use linear regression (on the
inverse square of these values) to fit them to δ = 1√
an+b
(where δ = Θ
(
1√
n
)
is our asymptotic
theoretical bound). We find that fit is reasonable, with mean square error of 0.038 to 0.057, even
for relatively few number of votes (n < 50). Based on the constant a in the fitted result (where
the larger the a, the smaller the δ and the more private) the ranking from least to most private
is: Borda, STV, Maximin, Plurality, and 2-approval. This ranking confirms our intuition that, for
example, a voting rule which does not use the whole ranking in the vote (eg. Plurality, 2-approval)
is more private than those which do. Yet it also informs us of the comparative information leakage
between rules like Borda, STV, and Maximin, all of which use the entire ranking of the vote. We
remark that STV is not in the subset of GSRs for which we have proven the asymptotic bound;
however, its concrete δ’s still fit well to 1√
an+b
.
1.2 Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3 we compute the DDP parameters
for the histogram mechanism. In Sections 4 we describe our definition of exactness and its relation
with utility based optimality. Then, in Sections 5 and 6 we prove our main asymptotic results
about eDDP for the case of two and arbitrary number of candidates, respectively. Finally, Section 7
includes our empirical estimations of the exact privacy parameters for the various rules used in this
work. For space reasons several details and proofs have been moved to a clearly marked appendix.
We have already discussed most relevant literature; for completeness in Appendix A we include a
more detailed review of these works.
2 Preliminaries and Notation
In this section we present our notation, and give an overview of Generalized Scoring Rules. We
use standard Differential Privacy (DP) [8] and Distributional Differential Privacy (DDP) defini-
tions [1,14]. For self-containment, we refer to Appendix ?? for these definitions.
We call the set of values a row in the database can take the universe, denoted by U . The set of
all databases of any size (i.e. number of rows), is denoted U∗, and the set of all databases of size
n ∈ N+ is Un. For a universe of finite b ∈ N+ values, and constant probabilities (p1, · · · , pb), we
denote by Xn,(p1,··· ,pb) the distribution on U∗, where the support is only in Un, and each of the n
rows is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variable which takes the value
xi with probability pi.
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Let C = {x1, . . . , xm} denote a set of m ≥ 1 alternatives (also called candidates). Let L(C) denote
the set of all linear orders over C, that is, all the set of antisymmetric, transitive, and total binary
relations. Each vote is a linear order V ∈ L(C). Let n denote the number of votes. In general, the
profile is the database of votes in the set L(C)∗, but for the voting rules we consider, the profile
P ∈ Nm! is the histogram of all votes. We consider a voting rule r to be a mapping that takes a
profile as input and outputs a unique winner in C.
For example, a positional scoring rule is characterized by a scoring vector s = (s1, . . . , sm) with
s1 ≥ s2 ≥ · · · ≥ sm. For any candidate c and any linear order V ∈ L(C), we let s(V, c) = sj ,
where j is the rank of c in V . Given a profile P , the positional scoring rule chooses a candidate
c that maximize
∑
V ∈P s(V, c) and break ties when multiple candidates have the highest score.
Plurality, k-approval (for any 1 ≤ k ≤ m), and Borda are positional scoring rules, with scoring
vectors (1, 0, . . . , 0), (1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
0, . . . , 0), (m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 0), respectively.
Another commonly used voting rules is the single transferable vote (STV) rule, which determines
the winner in steps: in each step, the alternative ranked in the top positions least often is eliminated
from the profile (and break ties when necessary), and the winner is the remaining candidate.
It turns out that many commonly studied voting rules belong to the class of Generalized Scoring
Rules (GSRs).
Definition 1 (Generalized Scoring Rules (GSR)). A Generalized Scoring Rules (GSR) is
defined by a number K ∈ N and two functions f : L(C) → RK and g, which maps any weak order
over the {1, . . . ,K} to C.
Given a vote V ∈ L(C), f(V ) is the generalized score vector of V . Given a profile P , we let
f(P ) =
∑
V ∈P f = f(V ), called the score. Then, then winning candidate is given by g(Ord(f(P ))),
where Ord is the function which outputs the weaker order of the K components in f(P ).
We say that a rule is in GSR if it can be described by some f , g as above. Examples of GSR rule
can be found in Appendix B.1.
3 Noiseless Privacy in Voting
In this section, we demonstrate that under standard assumptions in the voting literature, noising
the outcome is not necessary for achieving a reasonable notion of privacy. Concretely, we show that
the histogram mechanism Hist : U∗ → N|U| satisfies Distributional Differential Privacy (DDP) with
good parameters (Theorem 3).
Theorem 3 (DDP of the histogram mechanism). Let U = {x1, · · · , xb} and pmin = mini∈[c](pi).
For all (n) ≥ 2 ln(1 + 1pminn), there is a δ(n) = exp(−Ω(npmin[min(2 ln(2), (n))]2)) such that for
all n ∈ N, the histogram mechanism Hist : U∗ → Nb is ((n), δ(n), ∆ = {(Xn,(p1,··· ,pb), ∅)})-DDP.
Proof. (sketch) Let X = Xn,(p1,··· ,pb) and X−i|Xi = x be the database distribution except for the
ith row, which has been set to x. Since every row of X is independent, X−i|Xi = x is the same
distribution as X−i|Xi = x′ for any x′. Moreover, since every row is identically distributed, the
choice of row i is not important. On input a database missing the ith row, we let the simulator
guess the missing row as some x′, and apply the histogram mechanism to the resulting database.
Since the distribution X−i is independent of the value of missing row, the distribution of the
simulator’s output is Hist(X)|Xi = x′. The main idea here is that for any two sets S,B and any
value x, the probability Pr(Hist(X) ∈ S|Xi = x), is less than or equal to Pr(Hist(X) ∈ S∩B|Xi =
x) + Pr(Hist(X) ∈ B|Xi = x). For a choice of B, we can show that for any value x′ (which the
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simulator guesses to be the value of the missing row), the ratio Pr(Hist(X)∈S∩B|Xi=x)
Pr(Hist(X)∈S∩B|Xi=x′) ≤ e
. Then,
we show by Chernoff bound that Pr(Hist(X) ∈ B|Xi = x) is exponentially small in n, and let this
be δ. 
Like differential privacy, DDP is immune to post-processing 4 (This is formally argued in Lemma 3
in Appendix C). Thus, the result for histograms directly implies the same parameters for any
mechanisms that only depend on the histogram of the database—for example, the voting rules
we consider, which depend on the histogram of votes. This is formally stated (and proved) in
Appendix C (see Corollary 2).
4 Exact Privacy for Comparing Mechanisms
In this section we introduce a natural extension to privacy definitions, which we call exact privacy.
We first study this notion with respect to Differential Privacy (DP), by presenting its relationship
to the notion of utility. Then, we apply exact privacy to distributional differential privacy (DDP)
so that we can study noiseless mechanisms.
Intuitively, a mechanism has exact privacy with parameters  and δ if the mechanism cannot satisfy
the privacy definition with strictly better parameters.
Definition 2 (Exact Distributional Differential Privacy (eDDP)). A mechanism M is
(, δ,∆)-Exact Distributional Differential Privacy (eDDP) if it is (, δ,∆)-DDP and there does
not exist (′ ≤ , δ′ < δ) nor (′ < , δ′ ≤ δ) such that M is (′, δ′, ∆)-DDP.
The above definition can easily be altered to define (, δ)-exact differential privacy (eDP), by re-
placing each instance of DDP in definition with DP.
In order to better understand the use of exact privacy for comparing mechanisms it is useful to
investigate the relationship between utility and exact DP. Informally, Theorem 4 says that when
the utility is monotonically increasing with , then any optimal -DP mechanism is also -exact DP.
We show an example of an exact DP mechanism by applying this theorem (Corollary 3). However,
the converse of the theorem is not true—there exists an -exact DP mechanism that is not optimal
for a monotonically increasing utility function (Lemma 5). We refer to Appendix D for definitions
and proofs.
Theorem 4 (Utility optimality implies Exact Privacy). Let M be any set of mechanisms
and u be any utility function monotonically increasing over M. Then, an optimal (over M) -
differentially private mechanism M is -exact differentially private.
5 Comparing Voting Mechanisms: The Two-Candidate Case
In this section, we completely characterize exact distributional differential privacy (exact DDP) for
two candidates under any biased majority rule w.r.t. any i.i.d. distribution. To this end, we first
introduce an alternative definition of DDP which is equivalent to DDP in our setting (independent
database rows, no auxiliary information, and  = 0), then a technique called “trails” to bound the
exact DDP under the alternative definition.
Definition 3 (Alternative Definition of DDP). A mechanism M : U∗ → R is (, δ,∆ =
{(X, ∅)})-DDP if for all X ∈ ∆, the following inequality is satisfied for any i, any x, x′ ∈ Supp(Xi),
and S ∈ R
Pr(M(X) ∈ S|Xi = x) ≤ e Pr(M(X) ∈ S|Xi = x′) + δ
4 Note that post-processing is not a property of all privacy definitions, such as exact privacy defined in the next
section.
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The next lemma shows that when there is no auxiliary information, and when database rows are
independently distributed, Definition 3 above is equivalent to (the simulation-based) DDP ([1], see
Definition 8) up to parameter changes. In particular, when  = 0, the δ of the two definitions differs
by a constant factor of two, and since our results are asymptotic, our results for eDDP in the
alternative definition also holds for the simulation-based one.
Lemma 1. Suppose a mechanism M : U∗ → R is (, δ,∆ = {(X, ∅)})-(simulation-based) DDP,
then M is (2, (1 + e)δ,∆)-DDP for Definition 3. Conversely, if M is (, δ,∆ = {(X, ∅)})-DDP
for Definition 3 then M satisfies (, δ,∆)-(simulation-based) DDP.
In light of Definition 3, the (0, δ,∆)-eDDP of a mechanism can be characterized by
δ = max
S,x,x′
[
Pr(M(X) ∈ S|Xi = x)− Pr(M(X) ∈ S|Xi = x′)
]
(1)
However, the RHS of the equation is hard to bound. We address this challenge by breaking the
RHS into a summation over multiple sets, each of which contains consecutive histograms and is
called a trail. For any histogram (t1, · · · , tb) ∈ Nb, any z ∈ Z and j ≤ b, we let (t1, · · · , tb) + zxj
denote the histogram (t1, · · · , tj + z, · · · tb).
Definition 4 (Trail). Given a pair of data entries (j, k) where j 6= k, a histogram H, and a length
q, we define the trail TH,xj ,xk,q = {H − zxj + zxk) : 0 ≤ z ≤ q}, where (j, k) is called the direction
of the trail, H is called the entry of the trail, also denoted by Enter(TH,xj ,xk,q), and H − qxj + qxk
is called the exit of the trail, denoted by Exit(TH,xj ,xk,q).
Alternatively, a trail T can be defined by its direction, entry Enter(T), and exist Exit(T) = Enter(T)−
qxj + qxk.
Example 1. Figure 1 illustrates a trail Tx1,x2,(6,1),4 for b = 2, where the direction is (1, 2), the entry
is (6, 1), the exit is (2, 5), and the length is 4.
Fig. 1. Example of trail Tx1,x2,(6,1),4 for b = 2.
To bound the RHS of (1), we will divide the histograms which M maps to S {X : M(X) ∈ S} into
trails, and use the following theorem about trails to simplify the RHS.
Theorem 5 (Trails). Let T be a trail with direction (j, k), and let X be a database distribution
where each row is independently distributed. For any i, xj , xk ∈ Supp(Xi),
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Pr(Hist(X) ∈ T|Xi = xj)− Pr(Hist(X) ∈ T|Xi = xk) =
Pr(Hist(X) = Exit(T)|Xi = xj)− Pr(Hist(X) = Enter(T)|Xi = xk)
We are now ready to characterize exact DDP for any majority rule for two candidates. Let U =
L({x1, x2}). For any α ∈ [0, 1], let Mα denote the biased majority rule that outputs x1 when
at least αn entries have value x1, and otherwise outputs x2. For any p ∈ (0, 1), let Xn,(p,1−p)
denote the distribution over the database with n entries, where each entry is x1 with probability p
independently.
Theorem 6 (Exact DDP for Majority Rules). For any α ∈ [0, 1] and any p ∈ (0, 1), Mα is
(0, δ(n), ∆ = {(Xn,(p,1−p), ∅)})-eDDP, where
δ = Θ
(√
1
n
[( p
α
)α( 1− p
1− α
)1−α]n)
.
In particular, δ = Θ
(√
1
n
)
if and only if α = p; otherwise δ is exponentially small.
Proof. Let X = Xn,(p1,p2). Since there is no auxiliary information and  = 0, according to Def-
inition 3, to bound δ for Mα, we just need to bound the RHS of (1). We first gives an equiva-
lent definition of Mα(X) = xi using trails. Let trail T1 = {X : X = (i, n− i), i ≥ αn} and trail
T2 = {X : X = (i, n− i), i < αn}. It follows that Hist(X) ∈ Ti is equivalent to Mα(X) = xi for
any i ∈ [2]. Also, Definition 3 implies that S 6= {x1, x2} and S 6= Ø. Therefore, continuing Equation
(1), we have
δ = max
j∈[2],x,x′
[
Pr(Hist(X) ∈ Tj |Xi = x)− Pr(Hist(X) ∈ Tj |Xi = x′)
]
= max
j∈[2],x,x′
[
Pr(X = Exit(Tj)|Xi = x)− Pr(X = Enter(Tj)|Xi = x′)
]
(Theorem 5)
= max
j∈[2]
([
max
x
Pr(X = Exit(Tj)|Xi = x)
]
−
[
min
x′
Pr(X = Enter(Tj)|Xi = x′)
]) (2)
We first discuss the case that S = {x1} (j = 1), where trail T1 defined above starts at Enter(T1) =
(n, 0) and exits at Exit(T1) = (dαne, b(1− α)nc). For the Enter(T1) term in δ, we have,
min
x′
Pr(X = Enter(Tj)|Xi = x′) = Pr(X = (n, 0)|Xi = x2) = 0
For the Exit(T1) term in δ, we have,
Pr(X = Exit(T1)|Xi = x1)
= Pr(X = (dαne, b(1− α)nc)|Xi = x1) = Pr(X = (dαne − 1, b(1− α)nc))
= pdαne−1(1− p)b(1−α)nc (n− 1)!dαn− 1e! · b(1− α)nc!
= Θ
[
1√
n
·
(
pn
dαn− 1e
)dαn−1e
·
(
(1− p)n
b(1− α)nc
)b(1−α)nc]
(Stirling’s formula)
= Θ
(√
1
n
[( p
α
)α( 1− p
1− α
)1−α]n)
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Similarly, we have Pr(X = Exit(T1)|Xi = x2) = Θ
(√
1
n
[( p
α
)α ( 1−p
1−α
)1−α]n)
. It follows that
[
max
x
Pr(X = Exit(T1)|Xi = x)
]
−
[
min
x′
Pr(X = Enter(T1)|Xi = x′)
]
= Θ
(√
1
n
[( p
α
)α( 1− p
1− α
)1−α]n)
The case for S = {x2} is similar. We note that
( p
α
)α ( 1−p
1−α
)1−α ≤ 1 and the equation holds if and
only if p = α. 
6 Comparing Voting Mechanisms: Two Candidates or More
In this section we characterize (0, δ)-exact DDP for arbitrary number of candidates m ≥ 2. We
start with the general case for the histogram mechanism with any constant number of bins b. This
would immediately imply that the same results for the histogram mechanism in the voting setting
by letting b = m! (the number of possible linear orders on m candidates).
Theorem 7 (Exact DDP of Histogram Mechanism). For any b ≥ 2, let (p1, · · · , pb) be a fixed
nonzero probability distribution and let pmin = mini 6=j∈[b](pi + pj). There exists δ(n) = Θ
(√
1
npmin
)
such that for all n ∈ N, the histogram mechanism Hist is (0, δ(n), ∆ = {(Xn,(p1,··· ,pb), ∅)})-eDDP.
Proof. [Sketch] First we present the case for b = 2.
Lemma 2 (Exact DDP for Histogram, when c = 2). Let U = {x1, x2}. The histogram mech-
anism Hist : U∗ → N2 is (0, Θ(1/√n), ∆ = {(X2,(p1,p2), ∅)})-eDDP.
Proof. Let X = Xn,(p1,p2). Without loss of generality, we can let x = x1 and x
′ = x2 (otherwise,
rename them). Then, the maximizing set S in equation 1) is exactly the set of histograms such that
Pr(Hist(X) ∈ S|Xi = x1) > Pr(Hist(X) ∈ S|Xi = x2). Since our database distribution has iid
rows, with support on the set of size n databases, the histogram follows the binomial distribution
(with n trials). Below we find that S is the set of histograms (i, n− i) where i > pn.
Pr(Hist(X) = (i, n− i)|Xi = x1) > Pr(Hist(X) = (i, n− i)|Xi = x2)
pi−1(1− p)n−i (n− 1)!
(n− i)!(i− 1)! > p
i(1− p)n−i−1 (n− 1)!
(n− i− 1)!i!
i > pn
The histograms (i, n − i) where i > pn forms a trail T which starts from (n, 0) and exits at
(pn+ 1, n− (pn+ 1)). Thus,
δ = Pr(Hist(X) ∈ S|Xi = x)− Pr(Hist(X) ∈ S|Xi = x′)
= Pr(Hist(X) = Exit(T)|Xi = x1)− Pr(Hist(X) = Enter(T)|Xi = x2) (By Theorem 5)
= Pr(Hist(X) = (pn+ 1, n− (pn+ 1))|Xi = x1)− Pr(Hist(X) = (n, 0)|Xi = x2)
= ppn(1− p)n−pn−1 (n− 1)!
(pn)!(n− pn− 1)!
(When one row is fixed to x2, the probability of histogram being (n, 0) is zero.)
= Θ(1/
√
n) (By applying Stirling’s formula)

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We can generalize the result for b = 2, by using the trail technique, but for arbitrary number of
bins. Again we assume WLOG that x = x1 and x
′ = x2. Let ti denote the number of items in
the bin for xi. We observe that, when rows are i.i.d, the bins t3, · · · , tb are independent of t1, t2,
conditioned on the sum s = t1 + t2. This means that we can compute δ for general number of bins
b, as a sum
δ =
∑
0<s≤n
δs Pr(Bin(n, p1 + p2) = s)
Where δs is the δ-value for 2 bins, with database size s. Using Chernoff bound we see that Bin(n, p1+
p2) is concentrated at its mean n(p1 + p2). Using the result for b = 2, we get δ = Θ
(
1√
n(p1+p2)
)
.

We now define a set of properties for GSRs to characterize their eDDP.
Definition 5 (Canceling-out, Monotonicity and Locally stability). A voting rule satisfies
canceling-out, if for any profile P , adding a copy of every ranking does not change the winner.
More precisely, r(P ) = r(P ∪ L(C)).
A voting rule satisfies monotonicity if it is not possible to prevent a candidate from winning by
raising its ranking in a vote while keeping the order of other candidates the same.
A profile P ∗ is locally stable, if there exists an alternative a, a ranking W , and another ranking V
that is obtained from W by raising the position of a without changing the order of other alternatives,
such that for any P ′ in the γ neighborhood of P ∗ in terms of L∞ norm, we have (1) r(P ′) 6= a,
and (2) the winner is a when all W votes in P ′ becomes V votes.
To present the result, we first introduce an equivalent definition of GSR that is similar to the ones
used in [29,24].
Definition 6 (The (H, gH) definition of GSR). A GSR over m alternatives is defined by a set
of hyperplanes H = {h1, . . . ,hR} ⊆ Rm! and a function gH : {+, 0,−}|H| → C. For any anonymous
profile p ∈ Rm!, we let H(p) = (Sign(h1 ·p), . . . , Sign(hR ·p)), where Sign(x) is the sign (+,− or
0) of a number x. We let the winner be gH(H(p)).
That is, to determine the winner, we first use each hyperplane in H to classify the profile p, to
decide whether p is on the positive side (+), negative side (−), or is contained in the hyperplane (0).
Then gH is used to choose the winner from H(p). We refer to this definition the (H, gH) definition.
Claim 1 The (H, gH) definition of GSR is equivalent to the (f, g) definition of GSR in Definition 1.
We are now ready to present our theorem on GSRs that satisfy canceling-out, monotonicity, and
local stability. We will characterize exact DDP under uniform distribution and give an exponential
upper bound on DDP under some other distributions. For any pair of vectors D and h, we let
Dist(D,h) = D·h||h||2 .
Theorem 8 ((Exact) DDP for GSR). Fix m ≥ 2. Any mechanism M outputting the winner
of a GSR rule that satisfies canceling-out, monotonicity, and local stability is
(
0, δ(n) = Θ
(
1√
n
))
-
eDDP when each vote is i.i.d. and uniform over all linear orders on m candidates. Moreover, for
any vector pi of constant probabilities where component pi[i] > 0 is the probability of the ith (type
of) vote, then M is (0, δ(n), ∆ = {(Xn,pi, ∅)})-DDP, where
δ(n) = O
[
min
{
exp
(
− [minh∈H Dist(pi,h)]
2
3(m!)
(
maxi∈[m!] pi[i]
) · n) , √ 1
n
}]
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The exponential upper bound in Theorem 8 applies to any distribution characterized by pi that is not
on any hyperplane in GSR. Notice that the Lebesgue measure of distributions that is contained in
any hyperplane is 0. It follows that the upper bound on δ is exponentially small for any distribution
in a closed set that does not intersect with any hyperplane in the GSR, whose Lebesgue measure
can be arbitrarily close to 1.
Proposition 1. All positional scoring rules and all Condorcet consistent and monotonic rules
satisfy the conditions described in Theorem 8.
Corollary 1. Plurality, veto, k-approval, Borda, maximin, Copeland, Bucklin, Ranked Pairs, Schulze
are
(
0, Θ
(
1√
n
))
-eDDP when only the winner is announced, where each vote is i.i.d. and uniform
over linear orders on a constant number of candidates.
STV is not one of them. However, empirical results (Section 7) suggest that STV is likely also(
0, Θ
(
1√
n
))
-eDDP for this distribution.
7 Concrete Estimation of the Privacy Parameters
In this section we compute the concrete (0, δ)-exact DDP values for several voting rules in the
class of Generalized Scoring Rules (GSR). Recall that all voting rules in GSR are characterized
by functions (f ,g). On any profile (histogram of votes) P , the vector f(P ) is the score, and the
output of g on the score is the winner. We refer to [28] for the f and g functions of different rules
in GSR. The table below shows concrete ( = 0, δ)-exact distributional differential privacy (exact
DDP) values, using the database distribution where each row is iid and uniform over the set of
linear orders on three candidates. We compute concrete δ values for database sizes n < 50. Then,
we fit them to δ(n) = 1√
an+b
(our theoretical bound is δ(n) = Θ
(
1√
n
)
), using linear regression to
find the specific a, b values for each voting rule. We rank from least to most private, by the value a
for outputting the winner. The larger the a, the smaller the δ value and more private. The resulting
ranking is: Borda, STV, Maximin, Plurality, and 2-approval.
Rule \ Observable Winner Score
Borda δ(n) =
1√
1.347n+ 0.5263
δ(n) =
1√
0.7857n+ 0.8742
STV δ(n) =
1√
1.495n+ 0.02669
δ(n) =
1√
0.5226n+ 0.8244
Maximin δ(n) =
1√
1.553n+ 4.433
δ(n) =
1√
0.5226n+ 0.8244
Plurality δ(n) =
1√
1.717n− 0.09225 δ(n) =
1√
1.047n+ 1.173
2-approval δ(n) =
1√
1.786n+ 0.3536
δ(n) =
1√
1.047n+ 1.173
Table 1. Concrete (0, δ)-exact DDP values for outputting score and winner of various voting rules. Here we let each
row of the database to be independently and uniformly distributed over linear orders on three candidates.
In Figure 2 below, we show the comparison between Plurality, Borda, and STV voting rules. As
expected, outputting just the winner is more private than outputting the score (more easily seen
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in Figure 3). Moreover, Plurality, a rule which only depends on the top-ranked candidate in each
vote, is more private (leaks less information) than a rule like Borda, which uses the entire ranking.
We remark that when we use the GSR winner to rank the privacy of voting rules, then STV is
more private that Borda, but the opposite is true if we instead use the GSR score. We do not use
the GSR score to compare the privacy of voting rules. This is because rules like STV and Maximin,
the score has the same privacy as simply outputting the entire histogram of votes, and 2-approval
would have the same privacy as plurality. Thus, mechanism outputting the winner allows for a
better comparison.
Fig. 2. (0, δ)-exact DDP for GSR winner and score, as a function of the size of the database (the number of votes).
Fig. 3. Plurality score vs winner
In Table 2 we show the mean square error between the concrete δ values for the mechanism out-
putting the winner, and the the fitted curve in Table 1.
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Rule \ Error Mean Square Error (n ∈ [50])
Borda 0.0566844201243
STV 0.0542992943035
Maximin 0.0377631805983
Plurality 0.0477175838906
2-approval 0.0454223047191
Table 2. Mean square error between concrete δ privacy parameter for outputting the winner, and the fitted curve in
Table 1.
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A Related Literature
The first works on DP described how one can create mechanisms for answering standard statistical
queries on a database (e.g., number of records with some property or histograms) in a way that
satisfies the DP definition. This ignited a vast and rapidly evolving line of research on extending
the set of mechanisms and achieving different DP guarantees—we refer the reader to [11] for an
(already outdated) survey—to a rich literature of relaxations to the definition, e.g., [3,22,7,1], that
capture among others, noiseless versions of privacy, as well as works studying the trade-offs between
privacy and utility of various mechanisms [23,5,16,2,12].
Generalized Scoring Rules (GSRs) is a class of voting rules that include many commonly studied
voting rules, such as Plurality, Borda, Copeland, Maximin, and STV [28]. It has been shown that
for any GSR the probability for a group of manipulators to be able to change the winner has a phase
transition [28,24]. An axiomatic characterization of GSRs is given in [29]. The most robust GSR
with respect to a large class of statistical models has been characterized [6]. Recently GSRs have
been extended to an arbitrary decision space, for example to choose a set of winners or rankings
over candidates [27].
Differential privacy and applications to voting Differential privacy [8] was recently used to add
privacy to voting. Shang et al. [25] applied Gaussian noise to the histogram of linear orders, while
Hay et al. [17] used Laplace and Exponential mechanisms applied to specific voting rules. Lee [20]
also developed a method of random selection of votes to achieve differential privacy. [25,17] also
address the accuracy/privacy tradeoff of their DP mechanisms. An aspect of noising the output
that was observed in [4,20] is that it enables an approximate strategy-proofness; the idea here is
that the added noise dilutes the effect of any individual deviation, thereby making strategies which
would slightly perturb the outcome irrelevant. We remark that if one wishes to achieve DP for a
large number of voting rules, well-known DP mechanisms (like adding Laplace noise [10]) can be
applied to rules in GSR in a straightforward way, by adding noise to each component of the score
vector and outputting the winner based on the noised score vector. However, here we focus on exact
privacy of noiseless mechanisms.
Utility of mechanisms A number of works has explored the utility of mechanisms that achieve a
particular level of differential privacy. In [23], the utility is an arbitrary user-defined function, used
in the exponential mechanism. The works of [5,16,2] define utility in terms of error, where the
closer (by some metric) the output of the mechanism is from the query’s, the higher the utility.
The definition of [12] in addition allows the user to define a prior distribution on the query output.
Relaxations to Differential Privacy and Noiseless mechanisms Relaxations to differential privacy
have been proposed to allow mechanisms with less to no noise to achieve a DP-style notion of
privacy. Kasiviswanathan and Smith [19] formally proved that differential privacy holds in presence
of arbitrary adversarial information, and formulated a Bayesian definition of differential privacy
which makes adversarial information explicit. Hall et al. [15] suggested noising only certain values
(such as low-count components in histograms) to achieve a relaxed notion of Random Differential
Privacy with higher accuracy.Taking advantage of (assumed) inherent randomness in the database,
several works have also put forward DP-style definitions which allow for noiseless mechanisms.
Duan [7] showed that sums of databases with iid rows can be outputted without noise. Bhaskar
et al. [3] introduced Noiseless Privacy for database distributions with iid rows, whose parametres
depend on how far the query is from a function which only depends on a subset of the database.
Motivated by Bayesian mechanism design, Leung and Lui [21], suggested noiseless sum queries and
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introduced Bayesian differential privacy for database distributions with independent rows, where
the auxiliary information is some number of revealed rows. This idea was generalized and extended
by Bassily et al. who introduced distributional differential privacy (DDP) [1,14] which captures both
the randomness of the database and possible adversary auxiliary information. Informally, given a
distribution (X,Z) on both databases and the auxiliary information leaked, we say a mechanism
M is (, δ, (X,Z))-DDP if its output distribution M(X)|Z can be simulated by a simulator that
is given the database missing one row. In these works, noiseless mechanisms which have been
shown to satisfy DDP are exact sums, truncated histograms, and stable functions where with large
probability, the output is the same given neighboring databases.
B Preliminaries (Cont’d)
Two databases are neighbors if they differ in exactly one row5. Informally, a mechanism M’s
differential privacy measures the maximal distance between distributions M(X) and M(X ′), for
any two neighbors X and X ′. Intuitively, a row in the database represents one individual’s data,
so differential privacy describes how much the output is perturbed, if one person has changed (or
removed/added) his or her information.
Definition 7 (Differential Privacy (DP) [11]). A mechanism M : U∗ → R is (, δ)-differentially
private (DP) if for all neighboring databases X, X ′ and S ⊆ Range(M),
Pr(M(X) ∈ S) ≤ e Pr(M(X ′) ∈ S) + δ
Since the databases X and X ′ have no randomness, a mechanism M must be randomized to satisfy
differential privacy for any non-trivial parameters. In contrast, relaxations to DP like Distributional
Differential Privacy (DDP) below have allowed for noiseless mechanisms by letting the X be a
random variable. In this definition, the two neighboring databases are replaced by two “neighboring
distributions”, one with all the database rows (X), and one where the ith row is removed (X−i).
Both these distributions are conditioned on the ith row Xi being fixed to some value x. Intuitively,
the goal of the simulator Sim is to take the database missing the ith row, and emulate what M
would output on the database including its ith row.
Definition 8 (Distributional Differential Privacy (DDP) [1]). A mechanism M : U∗ → R
is (, δ,∆)-distributional differentially private (DDP) if there is a simulator Sim such that for
all D = (X,Z) ∈ ∆, for all i, (x, z) ∈ Supp(Xi, Z) (where Supp(.) denotes the support of a
distribution), and all sets S ⊆ R,
Pr(M(X) ∈ S|Xi = x, Z = z) ≤ e Pr(Sim(X−i) ∈ S|Xi = x, Z = z) + δ
and
Pr(Sim(X−i) ∈ S|Xi = x, Z = z) ≤ e Pr(M(X) ∈ S|Xi = x, Z = z) + δ
As we will see in Lemma 1, in the case without auxiliary information, and when each row in the
database is independently distributed, this definition is equivalent to the case where Sim guesses the
missing row and applies the mechanism on the resulting database (up to difference of (2, (1 +e)δ)
in the privacy parameter, see Theorem 1).
5 “Differ in one row” can mean two things: 1. (Unbounded differential privacy) Database X can be obtained from
database X ′ by adding or removing one row, or 2. (Bounded differential privacy) X can be obtained from X ′ by
changing value in exactly one row.
17
B.1 Examples of GSR
For example, any positional scoring rule with scoring vector s is a GSR, where K = m and the
corresponding fs and gs are defined as follows. For any V ∈ L(C) and any i ≤ m, [fs(V )]i is the
score of candidate xi in V , that is, s(V, xi). gs selects the candidate that corresponds to the largest
component in fs(P ) (and uses a tie-breaking mechanism when necessary).
STV is also a GSR with exponentially large K. For every proper subset A of C and every candidate
c not in A, there is a component in the generalized score vector that contains the number of times
that c is ranked first if all alternatives in A are removed. Let K =
∑m−1
i=0
(
m
i
)
(m−i); the coordinates
are indexed by (A, j), where A is a proper subset of C and j ≤ m,xj /∈ A. Let [f(V )](A,j) = 1, if
after removing A from V , xj is at the top of the modified V ; otherwise, [f(V )](A,j) = 0. Then, g
mimics the process of STV to select a winner.
C Noiseless Privacy in Voting (Cont’d)
Proof. [Theorem 3, The histogram mechanism satisfies DDP]
The proof is similar to Theorem 8 of [21].
Let X = Xn,(p1,··· ,pb). Since database rows are i.i.d., we simplify Pr(Hist(X−i) ∈ S|Xi = x) as
Pr(Hist(x,X−1) ∈ S).
We let the the simulator Sim in the definition be the function which guesses the missing row in the
database, and applies histogram mechanism on the resulting database. In other words, we need to
show that for all xi, xj ∈ {x1, · · · , xb}, and all S ⊆ Nb:
Pr(Hist(xi, X−1) ∈ S) ≤ e Pr(Hist(xj , X−1) ∈ S) + δ
We observe that for any set B and x:
Pr(Hist(x,X−1) ∈ S) = Pr(Hist(x,X−1) ∈ S ∩ B) + Pr(Hist(x,X−1) ∈ S ∩ B) (3)
≤ Pr(Hist(x,X−1) ∈ S ∩ B) + Pr(Hist(x,X−1) ∈ B) (4)
Let B be the set of all histogram t ∈ Nb where ti > pi(n − 1)e/2 and tj < pj(n − 1)e−/2. Fix a
choice of  > 2 ln(1 + 1pminn). We claim that for δ = exp(Ω(npmin(min(2 ln(2), ))
2), the following
hold:
Claim 1: Pr(Hist(xi, X−1) ∈ S ∩ B) ≤ e Pr(Hist(xj , X−1) ∈ S ∩ B)
Claim 2: Pr(Hist(xi, X−1) ∈ B) ≤ δ
If both claims are true, then by inequality 4,
Pr(Hist(xi, X−1) ∈ S) ≤ Pr(Hist(xi, X−1) ∈ S ∩ B) + Pr(Hist(xi, X−1) ∈ B)
≤ e Pr(Hist(xj , X−1) ∈ S ∩ B) + δ
≤ e Pr(Hist(xj , X−1) ∈ S) + δ
which proves the theorem. Below we will prove both claims.
Claim 1 proof:
Since all entries in random variable X−1 are i.i.d., the random variable
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Hist(X−1) which outputs the histogram of the database has distribution equal to the multinomial
distribution on n− 1 trials and b events:
Pr(Hist(X−1) = (t1, · · · , tb)) = (n− 1)!
t1! · · · tb! p
t1
1 · · · ptbb
where ti is the count of entries with the value xi and pi is the probability for an entry to have the
value xi.
Thus,
Pr(Hist(xi, X−1) = (t1, · · · , tb)) = (n− 1)!
t1! · · · (ti − 1)! · · · tb!p
t1
1 · · · pti−1i · · · ptbb
and
Pr(Hist(xj , X−1) = (t1, · · · , tb)) = (n− 1)!
t1! · · · (tj − 1)! · · · tb!p
t1
1 · · · ptj−1i · · · ptbb
So, for every t = (t1, · · · , tb) ∈ S ∩ B:
Pr(Hist(xi, X−1) = t)
Pr(Hist(xj , X − 1) = t) =
(n− 1)!
t1! · · · (ti − 1)! · · · tb!p
t1
1 · · · pti−1i · · · ptbb
(n− 1)!
t1! · · · (tj − 1)! · · · tb!p
t1
1 · · · ptj−1i · · · ptbb
=
ti
pi
pj
tj
=
ti
pi(n− 1)
pj(n− 1)
tj
By definition of B, ti > pi(n− 1)e/2 or tj < pj(n− 1)e−/2,
so t ∈ B has ti ≤ ti(n− 1)e/2 and tj ≥ pj(n− 1)e−/2
≤ pi(n− 1)e
/2
pi(n− 1)
pj(n− 1)
pj(n− 1)e−/2
= e/2 × e/2 = e
This proves Claim 1.
Claim 2 proof: Recall B is the set of all histogram t ∈ Nb where ti > pi(n − 1)e/2 and tj <
pj(n − 1)e−/2. For any i ∈ {1, · · · , b} let Hist(x,X−1)i denote ith component of the random
variable Hist(x,X−1).
Pr(Hist(xi, X−1) ∈ B)
= Pr
(
Hist(xi, X−1)i > pi(n− 1)e/2 or Hist(xi, X−1)j < pj(n− 1)e−/2
)
≤ Pr
(
Hist(xi, X−1)i > pi(n− 1)e/2
)
+ Pr
(
Hist(xi, X−1)j < pj(n− 1)e−/2
)
(By union bound)
= Pr
(
1 + Bin(n− 1, pi) > pi(n− 1)e/2
)
+ Pr
(
Bin(n− 1, pj) < pj(n− 1)e−/2
)
(Where Bin(n, p) denotes binomial r.v. with n trials and success probability p)
= Pr(Bin(n− 1, pi) > pi(n− 1)(e/2 − (pi(n− 1))−1))
+ Pr(Bin(n− 1, pj) < pj(n− 1)e−/2)
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The random variable Bin(n− 1, pi) has mean µ = pi(n− 1). When
2 ln(1 +
1
pi(n− 1)) < 2 ln(1 +
1
pmin(n− 1)) <  ≤ 2 ln(2) < 2 ln(2 +
1
pi(n− 1))
we have 0 < β = e/2 − (pi(n− 1))−1 − 1 < 1. By Chernoff bound,
Pr(Bin(n− 1, pi) > (1 + β)µ ≤ e−µβ2/3
= exp(−Ω(pi(n− 1)(e/2 − (pi(n− 1))−1 − 1)2))
= exp(−Ω(pin2))
The random variable Bin(n− 1, pj) has mean µ = pj(n− 1). By Chernoff bound, for any 0 < β =
1− e−/2 < 1 (ie.  > 0),
Pr(Bin(n− 1, pj) < (1− β)µ) ≤ e−µβ2/2
= exp(−Ω(pj(n− 1)(1− e−/2)2))
= exp(−Ω(pjn2))
So that:
Pr(Hist(xi, X−1) ∈ B) ≤ Pr(Bin(n− 1, pi) > pi(n− 1)(e/2 − (pi(n− 1))−1))
+ Pr(Bin(n− 1, pj) < pj(n− 1)e−/2)
≤ exp(−Ω(pin2)) + exp(−Ω(pjn2))
≤ exp(−Ω(pminn2)) = δ
for 2 ln(1 + 1pmin(n−1)) <  ≤ 2 ln(2). To get rid of the upper bound on , notice when  = 2 ln(2),
δ = exp(−Ω(pminn(2 ln(2))2)) suffices to satisfy the inequality
Pr(Hist(xi, X−1) ∈ S) ≤ e Pr(Hist(xj , X−1) ∈ S) + δ
Thus, when  > 2 ln(2), the same δ = exp = (Ω(npmin[min(2 ln(2), )]
2)) = exp(−Ω(pminn(2 ln(2))2))
also suffices, as a larger  only makes the right hand side of the inequality larger.
This proves Claim 2.

The definition of distributional differential privacy, like differential privacy, is immune to post-
processing. This means that if M is a (, δ,∆) private mechanism, and f is a function on the output
of M, then f ◦M (their composition) is also a (, δ,∆) private mechanism. Note that post-processing
immunity is not a property of exact privacy.
Lemma 3 (Immunity to Post-processing). Suppose mechanism M : U∗ → R is (, δ,∆)-DDP.
Let f : R → R′ be a deterministic function. Then f ◦M : U∗ → R′ is also (, δ,∆)-DDP.
Proof. For any X ∈ ∆, xi, x′i ∈ Supp(Xi) and S ⊆ R′, let W = {w : f(w) ∈ S} ⊆ U∗. Then
Pr(f(M(X)) ∈ S | Xi = xi)
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= Pr(M(X) ∈ W | Xi = xi) (By definition of W)
≤ e Pr(M(X) ∈ W | Xi = x′i) + δ (By M being (, δ,∆)-DDP)
= e Pr(f(M(X)) ∈ S | Xi = x′i) + δ (By definition of W)

By post-processing immunity, the parameters proven in Theorem 3 also apply to mechanisms whose
outputs are based on the histogram of the database.
Corollary 2 (DDP of any voting rule). Let U = L({x1, · · · , xm}) be the set of votes on m
candidates, let f : Nm! → R be any function on the set of histograms of votes (ie. profiles) Nm!,
and pimin = mini∈[m!](pi[i]), where pi[i] is the probability of the ith type of vote. For all (n) ≥
2 ln(1 + 1piminn), there is a δ(n) ∈ exp(−Ω(npimin[min(2 ln(2), (n))]2)) such that the mechanism
f ◦Hist : U∗ → R is ((n), δ(n), ∆ = {Xn,pi})-DDP.
D Exact Privacy for Comparing Mechanisms (Cont’d)
Below we present the definitions of a (monotonically increasing) utility function, and what it means
for an -DP mechanism to be optimal for a utility function.
Definition 9 (Utility function). A utility function u : (U∗ → R)→ R is any function taking as
input a mechanism M : U∗ → R and outputting real number.
A property we are interested in is when the best possible utility achievable among -DP mechanisms
is monotonically increasing with . Intuitively, this means when we allow for worse privacy, we can
always achieve better utility.
Definition 10 (Monotonically increasing). We say a utility function u is monotonically in-
creasing over a set of mechanisms M if its supremum increases monotonically with , ie.
∀ > ′ ≥ 0 sup
-DP mechanism M
M∈M
u(M) > sup
′-DP mechanism M
M∈M
u(M)
For any utility function, the optimal -DP mechanism is the one which maximizes the utility among
all -DP mechanisms.
Definition 11 (Optimal mechanism). For any utility function u, an optimal -differentially
private mechanism (DP) over set M is one that maximizes u among all -DP mechanisms in M,
ie.
u(M) = max
-DP mechanism M
M∈M
u(M)
Here, we show the proof for Theorem 4.
Proof. [Theorem 4] Let u be an utility function whose supremum increases monotonically with .
Suppose M is -DP and is optimal over M. In other words, for , the supremum is in fact the
maximum. To show M is -exact DP, it must satisfy:
1. M is -DP: This is satisfied by definition.
2. There is no ′ <  such that M is ′-DP. For contradiction assume there is such ′. Then,
u(M) = max
-DP mechanism M
M∈M
u(M) = sup
-DP mechanism M
M∈M
u(M) > sup
′-DP mechanism M
M∈M
u(M) ≥ u(M)
The last inequality is by assumption that M is ′-DP. This is a contradiction (we get u(M) >
u(M)). Thus, there must not exist such ′ and M is -exact DP.

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Example: Truncated Geometric mechanism [12] Here we show that the α-truncated geomet-
ric mechanism is  = ln(1/α)-exact DP (Corollary 3). By [12], the truncated geometric mechanism
is the unique optimal mechanism for a monotonically increasing utility function (see Lemma 4). By
Theorem 4, we see that this mechanism is -exact private.
Definition 12 (Loss function [12]). A loss function l(i; r) denotes an user’s loss when the query
result is i and the mechanism’s (perturbed) output is r. We allow l which is nonnegative and
nondecreasing in |i− r| for each fixed i.
Definition 13 (Oblivous mechanism). For a query f , A mechanism M is oblivious if its output
only depends on the output of the query on the database, f(X).
Definition 14 (Utility given loss function and priors). [12] Let M with range R be an
oblivious mechanism. Let f : Un → N = {1, · · · , n} be a count query. Let xir denote the probability
that M will output r given query output i = f(X). A user with prior {pi = Pr(f(D) = i)}i∈N , and
loss function l has utility
u(M) = −
∑
i∈N
pi
∑
r∈R
zir · l(i, r)
We remark that [12] defines disutility/expected loss 6 instead of utility, where the disutility is −u.
However, maximizing utility is the same as minimizing disutility.
Definition 15 (Geometric Mechanism). For a query f , and α ∈ [0, 1], the α-geometric mech-
anism is an oblivious mechanism, where for α ∈ (0, 1), M(D) = f(D) + Y ,
Pr(Y = z) =
1− α
1 + α
αz
When α = 1, the geometric mechanism outputs f(D). When α = 0, the geometric mechanism
outputs a value drawn from uniform distribution.
Definition 16 (Truncated Geometric Mechanism). The truncated α-geometric mechanism,
denoted Mα, truncates the output of the α-geometric mechanisms by remapping every value greater
than n to n, and every value less than 0 to 0.
Lemma 4. Let the loss function l(i, r) = 1 + γ|i − r| for a small γ when i 6= r and 0 otherwise.
For this loss function and uniform prior {pi = 1|N |}i∈N the utility is monotonically increasing over
the set of oblivious mechanisms.
Proof. By Lemma 5.12 in [12], the truncated α-geometric mechanism Mα is the (unique) optimal
mechanism over the set of oblivious -DP mechanisms M. In other words
u(Mα=e
−
) = sup
-DP mechanism M
M∈M
u(M)
To show that the utility is monotonically increasing, we show that for  > ′
u(Mα=e
−
) > u(Mα
′=e−
′
)
6 They also allow for an optimal remapping function which post-processeses the output of a mechanism. But for our
example we do not need this remapping function.
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Now we compute u(Mα). For a fixed i, let Geometric(α) denote the probability distribution on
the distance between the query output and the output of Mα (essentially, the absolute value of the
(truncated geometric) noise).
u(Mα) = −
∑
i∈N
pi
∑
r∈R
Pr(Mα(i) = r)l(i, r)
= − 1|N |
∑
i∈N
∑
r∈R
Pr(Mα(i) = r)l(i, r) (pi =
1
N )
= − 1|N |
∑
i∈N
∑
r∈N
Pr(Geometric(α) = |i− r|)l(i, r)
(For a fixed i, the (truncated) geometric noise only depends on the distance between i and r)
= − 1|N |
∑
i∈N
∑
r∈N ,r 6=0
Pr(Geometric(α) = |i− r|)(1 + γ|i− r|)
(The loss function equals zero when i = r and 1 + γ|i− r| otherwise.)
= − 1|N |
∑
i∈N
∑
r∈N ,r 6=0
Pr(Geometric(α) = |i− r|) + γ
∑
i∈N
∑
r∈N ,r 6=0
Pr(Geometric(α) = |i− r|)|i− r|

For each i,∑
r∈N ,r 6=0
Pr(Geometric(α) = |i− r|) =
∑
r∈N
Pr(Geometric(α) = |i− r|)− Pr(Geometric(α) = 0)
= 1− Pr(Geometric(α) = 0)
With smaller α, the distribution Geometric(α) is more concentrated around zero. Thus, Pr(Geometric(α) =
0) is larger, and 1− Pr(Geometric(α) = 0) is smaller. Moreover, for each i,
∑
r∈N ,r 6=0
Pr(Geometric(α) = |i− r|)|i− r| =
∑
r∈N
Pr(Geometric(α) = |i− r|)|i− r|
(When i = r, |i− r| = 0.)
= EGeometric(α)
With smaller α, the distribution Geometric(α) is more concentrated around zero. Thus, the ex-
pected value is smaller. Now, both values decrease monotonically with decreasing α. Thus, the
utility (the negative of these values) increases. In other words, with larger , the greater the utility
u(Mα=e
−
).
Then, for all  > ′ ≥ 0, we have
sup
-DP mechanism M
M∈M
u(M) = u(Mα=e
−
) > u(Mα
′=e−
′
) = sup
-DP mechanism M∈M
u(M)

Then, since the truncated geometric mechanism is optimal for the monotonically increasing utility
function in Lemma 4, it is -exact differentially private.
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Corollary 3. For 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and  = ln(1/α), the α-truncated geometric mechanism is -exact
differentially private.
The other direction of Theorem 4, however, is not true. By Lemma 5.12 in [12], the Laplace
mechanism [10] does not optimize a monotonically increasing utility function and yet it satisfies
exact privacy.
Lemma 5 (Exactness and Monotonically Increasing Does Not Imply Optimality). There
is a utility function u that is monotonically increasing over some setM, and a mechanism M ∈M
that satisfies -exact differential privacy, such that M does is not optimal for u.
Proof. [Lemma 5] Here we choose our monotonically increasing utility function u to be the one used
in Lemma 12, our set of mechanisms M to be the set of oblivious mechanisms, and our -exact
DP oblivious mechanism to be the Laplace mechanism. By Lemma 5.12 in [12], the truncated α-
geometric mechanism is the unique mechanism that optimizes u and so Laplace mechanism is not
optimal for u. Thus, to prove this lemma we need to show Laplace mechanism is -exact DP.
Fix . For a function f : U∗ → Rk, the sensitivity of the function is
∆f = max
X,X′neighbouring databases
||f(X)− f(X ′)||1
The Laplace mechanism, denoted M : U∗ → Rk outputs M(X) = f(X) + (Yi, · · · , Yk) where Yi
is iid drawn from Lap(∆f/). Let pX denote the probability densitity function of M(X) and pX′
denote the probability densitity function of M(X ′). Then,
max
z,neighbouring X,X′
pX(z)
pX′(z)
= max
z,neighbouring X,X′
k∏
i=1
exp(− |f(X)i−zi∆f )
exp(− |f(X′)i−zi∆f )
= max
z,neighbouring X,X′
k∏
i=1
exp
((|f(X ′)i − zi| − |f(X)i − zi|)
∆f
)
= max
neighbouring X,X′
k∏
i=1
exp
(|f(X ′)i − f(X)i|
∆f
)
(When zi ≤ f(X) and zi ≤ f(X ′))
= max
neighbouring X,X′
exp
(||f(X ′)− f(X)||1)
∆f
)
= exp() (When ||f(X)− f(X ′)||1 = ∆f)

E Comparing Voting Mechanisms: The Two-Candidate Case (m = 2) (Cont’d)
E.1 Proof for Lemma 1
Proof. [Lemma 1]
We prove the first statement, that is, if M is (, δ,∆ = {(X, ∅)})-(simulation-based) DDP [1], then
M is (2, (1 + e)δ,∆)-DDP of Definition 3.
24
By the definition of M being (, δ,∆)-(simulation-based) DDP, the simulator Sim has to satisfy the
below inequalities for any (X,Z = ∅) ∈ ∆, any i, and x ∈ Supp(Xi). With no auxiliary information
(ie. Z = ∅), we can write the inequalities in the DDP definition without Z as
Pr(M(X) | Xi = x) ≤ e Pr(Sim(X−i) | Xi = x) + δ
Pr(Sim(X−i) ∈ S|Xi = x) ≤ e Pr(M(X) ∈ S|Xi = x) + δ (5)
Now consider any x′ ∈ Supp(Xi), possibly different from the x above. By the definition of DDP,
the inequalities should also hold for x′, ie.
Pr(M(X) | Xi = x′) ≤ e Pr(Sim(X−i) | Xi = x′) + δ
Since the simulator is given the database without the ith row, its output does not depend on the
value of the ith row. Moreover, if database rows are independent, the distributions X−i|Xi = x′ =
X−i|Xi = x. Thus Pr(Sim(X−i) | Xi = x′) = Pr(Sim(X−i) | Xi = x). So,
Pr(M(X) | Xi = x′) ≤ e Pr(Sim(X−i | Xi = x) + δ
Pr(M(X) | Xi = x′) ≤ e(e Pr(M(X) ∈ S|Xi = x) + δ) + δ (By Equation 5 above.)
Pr(M(X) | Xi = x′) ≤ e2 Pr(M(X) | Xi = x) + eδ + δ
Thus, we have shown that for all x, x′ ∈ Supp(Xi) (and all i),
Pr(M(X) | Xi = x′) ≤ e2 Pr(M(X) | Xi = x) + (e + 1)δ
So, M is (2, (1 + e)δ,∆)-DDP, proving the first statement.
We now prove the second statement. That is, if M is (, δ,∆ = {(X, ∅)})-DDP of Definition 3 then
M is (, δ,∆)-(simulation-based) DDP. To do so, we define the simulator Sim to be the algorithm
which inserts any x′ ∈ Supp(Xi) to the missing ith row of the database, and apply M to the result.
By independence of rows, Pr(Sim(X−i) | Xi = x) = Pr(Sim(X−i) | Xi = x′) by our definition of
Sim, equal to Pr(M(X) | Xi = x′). Then, for any X ∈ ∆, i, and x, x′ ∈ Supp(Xi),
Pr(Sim(X−i) | Xi = x) = Pr(M(X) | Xi = x′) ≤ e Pr(M(X) | Xi = x) + δ
by inequality of Definition 3. This proves the second statement. 
E.2 Proof for Theorem 5
Proof. [Proof for Theorem 5] This equality comes from the simple observation that when the
database rows are independly distributed, for any histogram t ∈ Nb and any j ∈ [b]
Pr(Hist(X) = t|Xi = xj) = Pr(Hist(X−i) = t− xj)
Where X−i is distribution on the database without the ith row (well-defined as database rows are
independent). Let q be the length of the trail. For any 0 ≤ z < q, let tz = Enter(T ) − zxj + zxk.
Then,
Pr(Hist(X) = tz|Xi = xj) = Pr(Hist(X−i) = tz − xj)
= Pr(Hist(X) = tz − xj + xk|Xi = xk) = Pr(Hist(X) = tz+1|Xi = xk)
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In other words,
Pr(Hist(X) ∈ T|Xi = xj)− Pr(Hist(X) ∈ T|Xi = xk)
= Pr(Hist(X) = tq|Xi = xj)− Pr(Hist(X) = t0)
+
∑
0≤z<q
Pr(Hist(X) = tz|Xi = xj)− Pr(Hist(X) = tz+1|Xi = xk)
= Pr(Hist(X) = tq|Xi = xj)− Pr(Hist(X) = t0|Xi = xk) (Every term in the sum equals 0.)
= Pr(Hist(X) = Exit(T)|Xi = xj)− Pr(Hist(X) = Enter(T)|Xi = xk)

F Comparing Voting Mechanisms: The m > 2 Candidate Case (Cont’d)
F.1 Proof for Theorem 7
Lemma 6 (Conditional independence). Let U = {x1, · · · , xb} and D be distribution on databases
Un where each row is iid. Let #xi denote the r.v. of the number of occurences of the value xi in
D. Then, for all 0 ≤ l ≤ n, the random variables (#x1,#x2) and (#x3, · · · ,#xb) are independent
conditioned on #x1 + #x2 = l. In other words, for any (t1, · · · , tb) such that
∑
i ti = n, we have
Pr((#x1, · · · ,#xb) = (t1, · · · , tb) | #x1 + #x2 = l)
= Pr((#x1,#x2) = (t1, t2) | #x1 + #x2 = l)× Pr((#x3, · · · ,#xb) = (t3, · · · , tb) | #x1 + #x2 = l)
Proof. [Proof for Lemma 6] We equivalently show that
Pr((#x3, · · · ,#xb) = (t3, · · · , tb) | #x1 + #x2 = l)
= Pr((#x3, · · · ,#xb) = (t3, · · · , tb) | #x1 + #x2 = l ∧ (#x1,#x2) = (t1, t2))
(6)
Let D1 > D2 > · · · > Dl denote the random variable of row numbers (ie. locations in the database)
with value x1 or x2, in ascending order, conditioned on that there are exactly l such locations. By
total probability, the left hand side of Equation 6 is:
Pr((#x3, · · · ,#xb) = (t3, · · · , tb) | #x1 + #x2 = l)
=
∑
d1>d2>···>dl
Pr((#x3, · · · ,#xb) = (t3, · · · , tb) | #x1 + #x2 = l ∧ (D1, · · · , Dl) = (d1, · · · , dl))
× Pr((D1, · · · , Dl) = (d1, · · · , dl) | #x1 + #x2 = l)
We already assume there are exactly l entries with values x1 or x2, so
Pr((#x3, · · · ,#xb) = (t3, · · · , tb) | #x1 + #x2 = l)
=
∑
d1>d2>···>dl
Pr((#x3, · · · ,#xb) = (t3, · · · , tb) | (D1, · · · , Dl) = (d1, · · · , dl))
× Pr((D1, · · · , Dl) = (d1, · · · , dl))
The right hand side of Equation 6 is:
Pr((#x3, · · · ,#xb) = (t3, · · · , tb) | #x1 + #x2 = l ∧ (#x1,#x2) = (t1, t2))
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= Pr((#x3, · · · ,#xb) = (t3, · · · , tb) | #x1 + #x2 = l ∧ (#x1,#x2) = (t1, t2))
= Pr((#x3, · · · ,#xb) = (t3, · · · , tb) | (#x1,#x2) = (t1, t2)) (Since we assume t1 + t2 = l)
=
∑
d1>d2>···>dl
Pr((#x3, · · · ,#xb) = (t3, · · · , tb) | (#x1,#x2) = (t1, t2) ∧ (D1, · · · , Dl) = (d1, · · · , dl))
× Pr((D1, · · · , Dl) = (d1, · · · , dl) | (#x1,#x2) = (t1, t2))
(By total probability,)
Now given database locations (d1, · · · , dl), (#x3, · · · ,#xb) only depends on the rows in database D\
{d1, · · · , dl}. Since rows are independent, (#x3, · · · ,#xb) is independent of (#x1,#x2) (which are
values in locations (d1, · · · , dl)). Moreover, the locations (D1, · · · , Dl) are independent of (#x1,#x2).
As database rows are iid, no matter the locations (d1, · · · , dl), the distributions of (#x1,#x2) re-
main the same. Thus,
Pr((#x3, · · · ,#xb) = (t3, · · · , tb) | #x1 + #x2 = l ∧ (#x1,#x2) = (t1, t2))
=
∑
d1>d2>···>dl
Pr((#x3, · · · ,#xb) = (t3, · · · , tb) |(D1, · · · , Dl) = (d1, · · · , dl))
× Pr((D1, · · · , Dl) = (d1, · · · , dl))
This concludes that the left hand side and right hand side probabilities of Equation 6 are equal.
The random variables (#x1,#x2) are independent conditioned on (#x1,#x2). 
Below we present the proof of Theorem 7, using Lemma 2 which showed the case for b = 2.
Proof. [Proof of Theorem 7, Exact DDP of Histogram Mechanism]
Let X = Xn,(p1,··· ,pb). Since there is no auxiliary information and  = 0, we will use an equivalent
definition of DDP (Definition 3), setting  = 0. The histogram mechanism Hist : {x1, · · ·xb}∗ → Nb
is (0, δ,∆ = {(X, ∅)})-DDP if for any x, x′ ∈ Supp(Xi), and S ∈ R
δ ≥ Pr(Hist(X) ∈ S|Xi = x)− Pr(Hist(X) ∈ S|Xi = x′)
For exact DDP, it is Equation 1
δ = max
x,x′,S
Pr(Hist(X) ∈ S|Xi = x)− Pr(Hist(X) ∈ S|Xi = x′)
Like in the b = 2 case, without loss of generality, we can let x = x1 and x
′ = x2 (otherwise,
rename). Then, the maximizing set S is exactly the set of histograms such that Pr(Hist(X) ∈
S|Xi = x1) > Pr(Hist(X) ∈ S|Xi = x2). The set S from the b = 2 case generalizes to general
b. Since our database distribution has iid rows, with support on size n databases, the histogram
follows the multinomial distribution (with n trials). For any 0 < s ≤ n and (t3, · · · , tb) which sum
to n− s.
Pr(Hist(X) = (i, s− i, t3, · · · , tb)|Xi = x1) > Pr(Hist(X) = (i, s− i, t3, · · · , tb)|Xi = x2)
pi−11 p
n−i
2 p
t3
3 · · · ptbb
(n− 1)!
(i− 1)!(s− i)!t3! · · · tb! > p
i
1p
n−i−1
2 p
t3
3 · · · ptbb
(n− 1)!
(s− i− 1)!i!t3! · · · tb!
p2
s− i >
p1
i
i >
(
p1
p1 + p2
)
s
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Let p = p1p1+p2 . For any 0 < s ≤ n and (t3, · · · , tb) which sum to n − s, let Ts,(t3,··· ,tb) be the trail
starting from (s, 0, t3, · · · , tb) and exiting at (ps+ 1, s− (ps+ 1), t3, · · · , tb). The set S then can be
partitioned into such trails. Thus,
δ = Pr(Hist(X) ∈ S|Xi = x1)− Pr(Hist(X) ∈ S|Xi = x2)
=
∑
Ts,(t3,··· ,tb)
Pr(Hist(X) ∈ Ts,(t3,··· ,tb)|Xi = x1)− Pr(Hist(X) ∈ Ts,(t3,··· ,tb)|Xi = x2)
=
∑
Ts,(t3,··· ,tb)
Pr(Hist(X) = Exit(Ts,(t3,··· ,tb))|Xi = x1)− Pr(Hist(X) = Enter(Ts,(t3,··· ,tb))|Xi = x2)
(By Theorem 5)
=
∑
0<s≤n
∑
(t3,··· ,tb)
t3+···+tb=n−s
Pr(Hist(X) = (ps+ 1, s− (ps+ 1), t3, · · · , tb)|Xi = x1)
− Pr(Hist(X) = (s, 0, t3, · · · , tb)|Xi = x2)
Now let us consider the value of these two probabilities. Consider the distribution X−i, which is X
but without the ith row. Let the random variables that are individual components of Hist(X−1)
be (a1, · · · , ab). Since rows are distributed independently, for (t1, · · · , tb),
Pr(Hist(X) = (t1, · · · , tb)|Xi = x1)
= Pr(Hist(X−i) = (t1 − 1, t2, t3, · · · , tb))
= Pr((a1, · · · , ab) = (t1 − 1, t2, t3, · · · , tb)) (Recall these a’s are components of Hist(X−i))
= Pr((a1, · · · , ab) = (t1 − 1, t2, t3, · · · , tb)|a1 + a2 = s)× Pr(a1 + a2 = s)
= Pr((a1, a2) = (t1 − 1, t2) |a1 + a2 = s)× Pr((a3, · · · , ab) = (t3, · · · , tb) |a1 + a2 = s)× Pr(a1 + a2 = s)
(By Lemma 6, (a1, a2) and (a3, · · · , ab) are independent conditioned on a1 + a2 = s)
Similar to the b = 2 case, Pr(Hist(X) = (s, 0, t3, · · · , tb)|Xi = x2) = 0. This is because when one
row in the database is fixed to x2, it is impossible to have zero in the second component in the
histogram (the number of occurences of x2). Thus,
δ =
∑
0<s≤n
∑
(t3,··· ,tb)
t3+···+tb=n−s
Pr((a1, a2) = (ps, s− (ps+ 1))|a1 + a2 = s)
× Pr((a3, · · · , ab) = (t3, · · · , tb)|a1 + a2 = s)× Pr(a1 + a2 = s)
=
∑
0<s≤n
Pr((a1, a2) = (ps, s− (ps+ 1))|a1 + a2 = s)× Pr(a1 + a2 = s)
×
∑
(t3,··· ,tb)
t3+···+tb=n−s
Pr((a3, · · · , ab) = (t3, · · · , tb)|a1 + a2 = s)
=
∑
0<s≤n
Pr((a1, a2) = (ps, s− (ps+ 1))|a1 + a2 = s)× Pr(a1 + a2 = s)
(For any s, the second sum equals one.)
Where Pr((a1, a2) = (ps, s − (ps + 1))|a1 + a2 = s) is the δ value for the histogram mechanism,
when b = 2 and the distribution is Xs,(p,1−p) (recall p =
p1
p1+p2
). We denote this by δs. Moreover,
Pr(a1 + a2 = s) = Pr(Bin(n, p1 + p2 = p) = s)
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Where Bin(n, p) is the binomial distribution with n trials and probability p. Then
δ =
∑
0<s≤n
δs Pr (Bin (n, p) = s)
=
∑
s≥
(
1−
√
3
4
)
np
s≤
(
1+
√
3
4
)
np
Pr (Bin (n, p) = s)× δs +
∑
s<
(
1−
√
3
4
)
np
s>
(
1+
√
3
4
)
np
Pr (Bin (n, p) = s)× δs
Lower bound of δ:
δ ≥
∑
s≥
(
1−
√
3
4
)
np
s≤
(
1+
√
3
4
)
np
Pr (Bin (n, p) = s)× δs
Since δs decreases with larger s, δ(
1+
√
3
4
)
np
is the minimum.
≥ δ(
1+
√
3
4
)
np
×
∑
s≥
(
1−
√
3
4
)
np
s≤
(
1+
√
3
4
)
np
Pr (Bin (n, p) = s)
= δ(
1+
√
3
4
)
np
×
[
1− Pr
(
Bin(n, p) > (1 +
√
3
4
np)
)
− Pr
(
Bin(n, p) < (1−
√
3
4
np)
)]
By Chernoff bound for binomial distribution, for any 0 < β < 1, we have:
Pr (Bin (n, p) > (1 + β)µ) ≤ e−β
2µ
3
Pr (Bin (n, p) < (1− β)µ) ≤ e−β
2µ
2
Where µ = np is the mean of Bin (n, np). Now let β =
√
3
4 , which is between 0 and 1. Then,
1 ≥
[
1− Pr
(
Bin (n, p) >
(
1 +
√
3
4
)
np
)
− Pr
(
Bin (n, p) <
(
1−
√
3
4
)
np
)]
≥ 1− e− 34 µ3 − e− 34 µ2
= 1− e−np2 − e− 3np2
(For large enough n, np ≥ 1, so e−np2 ≤ e−1/2 and e− 3np2 ≤ e−3/2)
≥ 1− e−1/2 − e−3/2 ≥ 1
10
Which means
[
1− Pr
(
Bin(n, p) >
(
1 +
√
3
4
)
np
)
− Pr
(
Bin(n, p) <
(
1−
√
3
4
)
np
)]
= Θ(1).
By Stirling formula, we have
δ(
1+
√
3
4
)
np
= Θ
 1√(
1 +
√
3
4
)
np

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= Θ
(√
1
np
)
(Recall we assumed the maximizing x, x′ are x1, x2, up to renaming the xi’s, and that p = p1 + p2)
= Θ
(√
1
npmin
)
(In general, pmin = mini 6=j∈[b](pi + pj).)
Which gives us the lower bound δ ≥ Θ
(√
1
npmin
)
.
Upper bound of δ:
δ =
∑
s≥
(
1−
√
3
4
)
np
s≤
(
1+
√
3
4
)
np
Pr (Bin (n, p) = s)× δs
+
∑
s<
(
1−
√
3
4
)
np
s>
(
1+
√
3
4
)
np
Pr (Bin (n, p) = s)× δs
Since δs ≤ 1 for all s and
∑
s≥
(
1−
√
3
4
)
np
s≤
(
1+
√
3
4
)
np
Pr (Bin (n, p) = s) ≤ 1
≤ max(
1−
√
3
4
)
np ≤s ≤
(
1+
√
3
4
)
np
(δs) +
∑
s<
(
1−
√
3
4
)
np
s>
(
1+
√
3
4
)
np
Pr (Bin (n, p) = s)
= δ(
1−
√
3
4
)
np
+ Pr
(
Bin (n, p) <
(
1−
√
3
4
)
np
)
+ Pr
(
Bin (n, p) >
(
1 +
√
3
4
)
np
)
≤ δ(
1−
√
− 3
4
)
np
+ e−
np
2 + e
3np
2 (By Chernoff bound for binomial)
≤ δ(
1−
√
− 3
4
)
np
+ 2
√
1
np
(Since np ≥ 0, both e−np2 , e 3np2 ≤
√
1
np)
By Stirling’s formula, δ(
1−
√
− 3
4
)
np
= Θ
 1√(
1−
√
−34
)
np

= Θ
(√
1
np
)
As is with the lower bound, in general (without assuming (x, x′) = (x1, x2)), we have p = pmin =
mini 6=j∈[b](pi + pj). Since both lower and upper bounds of δ are Θ
(√
1
npmin
)
, δ = Θ
(√
1
npmin
)
. 
F.2 Proof for Claim 1, Theorem 8 and Proposition 1
Proof. [Proof for Claim 1] We first show that any (H, gH) GSR can be represented by a (f, g) GSR
in the following way: for each ranking V , we let f(V ) = (h1 ·eV , h2 ·eV , . . . ,hR ·eV , 0). Then, the g
function mimics gH by only focusing on orderings between the kth component of f(P ) and the last
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component, which is always 0, for all k ≤ R. More precisely, ordering between the kth component
of f(P ) and 0 uniquely determines Sign(hk · p).
We now prove that any f − g GSR can be represented by an H − gH GSR. For any pair of distinct
component k1, k2 ≤ K, we introduce a hyperplane hk1,k2 = ([f(V )]k1 − [f(V )]k2)V ∈L(C). Therefore,
for any profile p, hk1,k2 · p = [f(p)]k1 − [f(p)]k2 . The sign of hk1,k2 · p corresponds to the order
between [f(p)]k1 and [f(p)]k2 . Then, gH mimics g. 
Proof. [Theorem 8, (Exact) DDP for GSR]
We first shows that w.l.o.g. we can assume that all hyperplanes in H passes 1.
Lemma 7. A GSR satisfies canceling-out, if and only if there exists another equivalent GSR r =
(H, gH), where all hyperplanes passes 1.
Proof. The “if” direction is straightforward. To prove the “only if” part, it suffices to prove
that gH does not depend on outcomes of hyperplanes in H that does not pass 1. W.l.o.g. let
h1 ∈ H denote the hyperplane that does not pass 1, that is, h · 1 6= 0. We will prove that for
any u−1 ∈ {−1, 0, 1}L−1 and any u1, u′1 ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, such that there exist profiles P,Q with
H(P ) = (u1,u−1) and H(Q) = (u′1,u−1), we have gH(u1,u−1) = gH(u′1,u−1).
For the sake of contradiction, suppose this does not hold and let P,Q be the profiles such that
H(P ) and H(Q) differ on the first coordinate, and r(P ) 6= r(Q). Then, for sufficiently large
n we have that H(P + nL(C)) = H(Q + nL(C)). This is because for any h ∈ H that passes
1, we have h · (P + nL(C)) = h · P = h · (Q + nL(C)). For any h ∈ H that does not pass
1, we have h · (P + nL(C)) = h · P + nh · 1, and when n is sufficiently large, the sign of
h ·(P +nL(C)) is the same as the sign of nh ·1, which is the sign of h ·(Q+nL(C)). This means that
Sign(h·P ) = Sign(h·(P+nL(C))) = Sign(h·(Q+nL(C))) = Sign(h·Q), which is a contradiction. 
Let r be a GSR, P ∗ be the locally stable profile and a be the alternative, V,W be the rankings as
in the statement of Definition 5. W.l.o.g. suppose V is the first type ranking and W is the second
type ranking. In other words, V (respectively, W ) is the first (respectively, second) coordinate in
the m-profiles space. We will show that the exact DDP bound is achieved when S is the set of all
profiles where the winner is a.
We recall that for any profile P , a pair of different votes V,W , . and a length q ∈ N, TP,V,W,q is the
trail starting at P , going along the V −W direction, and contains q profiles. We let TP,V,W,∞ =
maxq TP,V,W,q denote the longest V − W trail starting at P . For a GSR r, we define End(a) =
{Exit(TP,V,W,∞) : ∀V,W ∈ U , r(P ) = a}. In other words, there is no W votes in End(a).
Because r satisfies monotonicity, for any profile P such that r(P ) = a, we must have that a is
the winner under all profiles in the V -W trail starting at P . Therefore, S can be partitioned into
multiple non-overlapping trails, each of which starts at a different profile, where a is the winner,
and a is no longer the winner if we go one step into the W -V direction. Formally, we let End(a)
(shown in Figure 4) denote all n-profiles P such that (1) r(P ) = a and (2) r(P + W − V ) 6= a.
Then, we define a partition Sa as follows.
Sa = {P : r(P ) = a} =
⋃
P∈End(a)
TP,V,W,∞
It follows from Theorem 5 that
Pr(P ∈ Sa|X1 = V )− Pr(P ∈ Sa|X1 = W ) =
∑
P∈End(a):P (V )>0
Pr(P − V ).
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Fig. 4. Example of End(a) and End(b), where there are 3 kinds of votes.
We will define a subset of n-profile, Rn and prove the lower bound on it. For a locally stable profile
P ∗ (with constant γ in the statement of Definition 5), let p0 = P ∗−1 · |P
∗|
m! . That is, p0 be obtained
from P ∗ by subtracting a constant in each component, such that p0 · 1 = 0. For any n, we define
Rn to be the set of n-profiles that are in the γ
√
n neighborhood of nm! · 1 +p0 ·
√
n w.r.t. L∞ norm
for last m!− 2 dimensions. That is,
Rn =
{
P : P [V ] = 0 and ∀j ≥ 3,
∣∣∣P [j]− ( n
m!
+ p0[j] ·
√
n
)∣∣∣ ≤ γ√n}
Throughout the proof in Theorem 8, we will use pi to denote the database distribution D, and pi[j]
denote the probability of j-th kind of ranking. Here P [V ] is the number of V votes in P and P [j] is
the number of j-th type of vote in P . For any P ∈ Rn, we let Piv(P ) = End(a) ∩ TP,V,W,∞ denote
the intersection of End(a) and the V -W trail starting at P . That is, Piv(P ) = P + l(V −W ) for
some l ∈ Z, r(Piv(P )) = a, and r(Piv(P )− V +W ) 6= a.
We next prove that the number of V votes in Piv(P ) and the number of W votes in Piv(P ) are
close—the difference is O(
√
n).
Claim 2 For any P ∈ Rn, we have |Piv(P )[V ]− Piv(P )[W ]| = O(
√
n).
Proof. Let Q+ = Piv(P ) and Q− = Piv(P )− V +W . We note that Piv(P ) is at the boundary of
S, which means that r(Q+) 6= r(Q−). Therefore, because r is a GSR, the line segment between Q+
and Q− must contain the intersection of TP,V,W,∞ and a hyperplane h ∈ H. Therefore, it suffices
to show that the difference in number of V votes and number of W votes at the intersection of
TP,V,W,∞ and any hyperplane h is O(
√
n).
We recall that by Lemma 7, all hyperplanes for r pass 1. For any h ∈ H, we recall that we
assumed that V and W corresponds to the first and second coordinate, respectively. Because h ·
(P + l(V −W )) = 0, we have (h2 − h1)l = h · P = h · (P − 1 · nm!) = O(
√
n). This means that
|l| = |Piv(P )[V ]− Piv(P )[W ]| = O(√n). 
Claim 3 For any P ∈ Rn, there is a V -W trail passing P .
Proof. According to the cancelling our property of r, we can construct profile P ′ = P − n−|P ∗|
√
n
m! ,
which is equivalent to P . For any profile P ∈ Rn, we have
∣∣P [j]− ( nm! + p0[j] · √n)∣∣ ≤ γ√n, which
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is equivalent with |P ′[j]− P ∗[j] · √n| ≤ γ√n, which means P ′√
n
is in the γ neighborhood of profile
P ∗ in terms of the 3-rd to m!-th dimensions. According to the (H, gH) definition of GSR, we know
r(P ∗) = r(P ′) and the claim follows by local stability of P ∗. 
We will show that the probability of a subset of End(a)—the pivotal profiles on trails starting at
profiles in Rn—is Θ(1/
√
n) for the condition that pi is uniform over U . Let R−n ⊆ Rm!−2 and for
any p− ∈ R−n , we define Piv(p−) = Piv(P ), where P ∈ Rn and P [3, . . . ,m!] = p−.
∑
P∈End(a)
Pr(P − V ) ≥
∑
P∈Rn
Pr(Piv(P )− V )
=
∑
p−∈R−n ,|P |=n−1
Pr(P [3, ...,m!] = p−) Pr(P [1] = Piv(p−)[1]− 1,Pr(P [2] = Piv(p−)[2]|P [3, ...,m!] = p−)
=
∑
p−∈R−n ,|P |=n−1
A(p−)B(p−)
where A(p−) = Pr(P [3, . . . ,m!] = p−) and
B(p−) = Pr(P [1] = Piv(p−)[1]− 1,Pr(P [2] = Piv(p−)[2]|P [3, . . . ,m!] = p−)
It follows that B(p−) is equivalent to probability of flipping a coin (
pi[W ]
pi[V ]+pi[W ] probability for head)
for Piv(p−)[1] + Piv(p−)[2] − 1 times, with Piv(p−)[1] − 1 heads and Piv(p−)[2] tails. The next
lemma gives a lower bound to
∑
p−∈R−n ,|P |=n−1A(p−)B(p−) when pi is a uniform distribution.
Lemma 8.
∑
p−∈R−n ,|P |=n−1A(p−)B(p−) = Ω
(
1√
n
)
if pi is uniform over U .
Proof. We first give a claim saying the total number of V and W votes in P ∈ Rn is Θ(n).
Claim 4 Piv(p−)[1] + Piv(p−)[2]− 1 = Θ(n) for all p− ∈ R−n .
Proof.
∣∣∣Piv(p−)[1] + Piv(p−)[2]− 2n
m!
∣∣∣ = m!∑
j=3
∣∣∣P [j]− n
m!
∣∣∣ ≤ m!∑
j=3
(
γ
√
n+ |p0[j]|
√
n
) ≤ (γ + 1)m!√n

According to Claim 2 & 4, we know that B(p−) is equivalent to probability of flipping a fair coin
for 2nm! + c1
√
n times and get nm! + c2
√
n, where c1 and c2 are bounded constants. In the next claim,
we will give a tight bound to B(p−) for uniform distributed entries.
Claim 5 B(p−) = Θ
(√
1
n
)
for any p− ∈ R−n
Proof. Letting n′ = 2nm! +c1
√
n, c′ = c2− c12 and assuming n′ is a even number, for the lower bound,
we have,
B(p−) =
(
1
2
) 2n
m!
+c1
√
n( 2n
m! + c1
√
n
n
m! + c2
√
n
)
=
(
1
2
)n′ ( n′
n′/2 + c′
√
n
)
=
(
1
2
)n′
·
(
n′
n′/2
)
·
n′
2 × · · · × (n
′
2 − c′
√
n′ + 1)
(n
′
2 + c
′√n′ − 1)× · · · × n′2
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>
1
2n′
(
n′
n′/2
)
·
(
n′/2− c′√n′
n′/2
)c′√n′
=Ω
(
1√
n
)
(applying Stirling’s Formula)
Upper bound can be obtained using similar technique as lower bound. 
The next claim gives a lower bound on
∑
p−∈R−n A(p−), using the main technique of Lindeberg-Levy
Central Limit Theorem [13].
Claim 6
∑
p−∈R−n A(p−) = Ω (1).
Proof. We first define a set of m!−2 dimensions random variables that Yi = (Yi[1], · · · , Yi[m!− 2]),
where Yi[j] = 1 if ranking j happens to i-th row and Yi[j] = 0 otherwise. According to the definition
of profile, we have P [j + 2] =
∑n
j=1 Yi[j] and E(P [j]) =
n
m! for uniform case. We further define
a m! − 2 dimensional random vector u such that u[j] = (P [j + 2]− nm!) /√n, which is the scaled
average of Y1, · · · , Yn. According to Lindeberg-Levy Central Limit Theorem [13], we know that the
distribution of u converges in probability to multivariate normal distribution N (0, Σ), where
Σ =

m!−1
(m!)2
− 1
(m!)2
· · · − 1
(m!)2
− 1
(m!)2
m!−1
(m!)2
· · · − 1
(m!)2
...
...
. . .
...
− 1
(m!)2
− 1
(m!)2
· · · m!−1
(m!)2

.
Since each diagonal element in Σ is strictly larger than the sum of the absolute value of all other
elements in the same row, we know that Σ is non-singular according to Levy-Desplanques Theorem
[18]. According to Varah et al. [26], we obtain a bound on Σ−1’s L∞ norm as,
||Σ−1||∞ ≤ 1
mini
(
|Σii| −
∑
j 6=i |Σij |
) ≤ (m!)2
2
.
For any m!−2 dimensional random vector u constructed from a profile P using the procedure that
u[j] =
(
P [j + 2]− nm!
)
/
√
n, we have,
P ∈ R−n if and only if u ∈ U = {u : |u[j]− p0[j]| ≤ γ, ∀j ∈ [m!− 2]} .
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Thus, for all u ∈ U we know about its Probability Density Function (PDF) that,
PDF(u) =
1√
(2pi)m!−2|Σ| exp
(
−1
2
uTΣ−1u
)
=
1√
(2pi)m!−2|Σ| exp
(
−1
2
|uTΣ−1u|
)
≥ 1√
(2pi)m!−2|Σ| exp
(
−1
2
||uTΣ−1||∞ · ||u||1
)
(Holder’s Inequality)
≥ 1√
(2pi)m!−2|Σ| exp
(
−1
2
||uT ||∞ · ||Σ−1||∞ · ||u||1
)
≥ 1√
(2pi)m!−2|Σ|
[
exp
(
(m!)2
4
)]−||u||2∞
= Ω (1) .
Thus, letting Vol(·) be the volume function,∑
p−∈R−n
A(p−) ≥ Vol(U) ·min
u∈U
PDF(u) ≥ γm!−2 ·Ω (1) = Ω(1).

Lemma 8 follows be combining Claim 6 and Claim 5. 
Recalling Theorem 5, for the case that pi is uniform over all ranking, we have,
δ = max
x,x′,S
Pr(M(X) ∈ S|X1 = x)− Pr(M(X) ∈ S|X1 = x′)
≤Pr(M(X) ∈ Sa|X1 = W )− Pr(M(X) ∈ Sa|X1 = V )
=
∑
P∈End(a)
Pr(P − V ) = Ω
(
1√
n
)
.
Then, we derive an upper bound of δ using the similar technique of lower bound (pi can be non-
uniform for this bound). We first define R′n, a subset of n-profile space, where event P ∈ R′n will
be proved to happen with high probability.
R′n =
{
P : P [V ] = 0 and ∀j ≥ 3, |P [j]− (n · pi[j])| ≤ n3/4
}
.
Then, we recall Theorem 5, for the case that pi such that mini pi[i] > 0, we have,
δ = max
V,W,S
Pr(P ∈ S|X1 = V )− Pr(P ∈ S|X1 = W )
≤max
V,W
m∑
i=1
Pr(P ∈ Si|X1 = V )− Pr(P ∈ Si|X1 = W ) =
m∑
i=1
∑
P∈End(xi)
Pr(P − V ).
where Si = {X : r(X) = xi} =
⋃
P∈End(xi) TP,V,W,∞. The next claim gives am upper bound on the
number of pivotal profiles sharing one End.
Claim 7 For any profile P in R′n, there are at most |H| pivotal profiles following V −W direction.
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Proof. We know from the (H, gH) definition of GSR that r’s output only changes while passing at
least one hyperplane. Considering a trial TP0 enter at (P0[1] + P0[2], 0, P0[3], · · · , P0[m!]) and exit
at (0, P0[1] + P0[2], P0[3], · · · , P0[m!]) (P0 is an arbitrary n-profile). Thus, there are at most |H|
pivotal profiles sharing the same end point because TP0 passes hyperplanes at most |H| times. 
Using the partition of R′n and arbitrarily selected candidate a, we have,
∑
P∈End(xi)
Pr(P − V ) ≤|H|
 ∑
P∈R′n
Pr(Piv(P )− V ) +
∑
P∈End(xi)\R′n
Pr(Piv(P )− V )

≤|H|
 ∑
p−∈R′−n ,|P |=n−1
A(p−)B(p−) +
∑
p− 6∈R′−n ,|P |=n−1
A(p−)B(p−)

≤|H|
 max
p−∈R′−n
B(p−) ·
∑
p−∈R′−n
A(p−) + max
p− 6∈R′−n
B(p−) ·
∑
p− 6∈R′−n
A(p−)

=O
(
1√
n
)
·O(1) +O(1) ·O
(
1√
n
)
(by applying Claim 9)
=O
(
1√
n
)
The next claim gives an upper bound to
∑
p− 6∈R−n A(p−).
Claim 8
∑
p− 6∈R′−n A(p−) = O
(
1√
n
)
.
Proof.
Let Y
(i)
j = ”the i-th agent gives vote of type j”. It is easy to find that P [j] =
∑n
i=1 Y
(i)
j , E(P [j]) =
npi[j] and V ar(P [j]) = npi[j](1− pi[j]). Thus,
∑
p− 6∈R−n
A(p−) = Pr
 m!⋃
j=3
{
|P [j]− n · pi[j]| ≤ n3/4
}
≤
m!∑
j=3
Pr
[{ ∣∣∣P [j]− E(P [j])∣∣∣ ≤ n3/4}]
≤
m!∑
j=3
npi[j](1− pi[j])
n3/2
(by Chebyshev’s Inequality)
=O
(
1√
n
)

Then, all we need is a upper bound on B(p−), and we first prove that the length of V −W sequence
is Θ(n) for all P ∈ R′n.
Claim 9 Piv(p−)[1] + Piv(p−)[2]− 1 = Θ(n) for all P ∈ R′n.
Proof.
|Piv(p−)[1] + Piv(p−)[2]− n(pi[W ] + pi[V ])| =
m!∑
j=3
|P [j]− n · pi[j]| ≤
m!∑
j=3
n3/4 ≤ m! · n3/4
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
Then, using the same technique of Claim 5, we know that,
B(p−) = Θ
(√
1
n
)
for all p− ∈ R′−n
Thus, combining all results above, we have,
δ ≤
m∑
i=1
∑
P∈End(xi)
Pr(P − V ) =
m∑
i=1
∑
P∈End(xi)
Pr(P − V ) = O
(
1√
n
)
Next, we will give a exponential (tighter) upper bound on δ when pi does not belong to any
hyperplanes.
We first gives a generalized definition of pivotal profile.
Definition 17 (Generalized Pivotal Profile). Profile P is a (generalized) pivotal profile if there
exist pair of votes V and W such that r(P ) 6= r(P − V +W ).
In the next lemma we will show generalized pivotal profiles only lays close to hyperplanes. We fist
gives definition of distance function Dist(·, ·):
1. for hyperplane h and a point (n-profile) P , Dist(h, P ) = h·P||h||2 , which is the Euclidian distance
between P and hyperplane h · p = 0.
2. for 2 points (n-profile) P1 and P2, Dist(h, P ), returns the Euclidian distance between P1 and P2.
Claim 10 For any GSR r = (H, gH) and one of its generalized pivotal profile P , there must exists
one hyperplane h ∈ H such that Dist(h, P ) ≤ √2.
Proof. Recalling the definition of generalized pivotal profiles, we know the GSR winner will change
at the 1 neighborhood of P . Thus, there must exist a hyperplane h ∈ H and pair of votes V,W
such that Sign [h · P ] 6= Sign [h · (P + V −W )] and Dist(h, P ) ≤ Dist(P, P + V −W ) = √2. 
Lemma 9. Let D be the distribution on profiles (databases of votes), where each entry is iid ac-
cording to distribution pi over linear orders on m candidates. GSR r(H,hH) is (0, δ,D) DDP when
only the winner is announced, where
δ = O
[
exp
(
− [minh∈H Dist(pi, h)]
2
3(m!)2
(
maxi∈[m!] pi[i]
) · n)] = O [e−Θ(n)] .
Proof. We first define the set of all generalized pivotal profiles PPiv. For any P ∈ PPiv, we know
that there exist hyperplane h ∈ H such that Dist(h, P ) ≤ √2. According to triangular inequality,
we have Dist(npi, P ) ≥ Dist(npi, h)− Dist(h, P ) ≥ nDist(pi, h)−√2. Thus, there must exist one
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dimension j that |P [j]− npi[j]| ≥ nDist(pi, h)−
√
2
m! . Then, we bound δ as,
δ = max
V,W,S
[Pr(P ∈ Si|X1 = V )− Pr(P ∈ Si|X1 = W )]
≤
∑
P∈PPiv
[
max
V
Pr(P ∈ PPiv|X1 = V )
]
≤max
V,h,j
Pr
(
|P [j]− npi[j]| ≥ nDist(pi, h)−
√
2
m!
∣∣∣∣X1 = V
)
≤max
h,j
Pr
(
|P [j]− npi[j]| ≥ nDist(pi, h)−
√
2
m!
− 1
)
=O
[
exp
(
− [minh∈H Dist(pi, h)]
2
3(m!)2
(
maxi∈[m!] pi[i]
) · n)]by applying Chernoff bound.

Theorem 8 follows by combining all three bounds derived above. 
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 1] Suppose s1 = · · · = sl > sl+1. We let V = [a  c1  cl−1  b 
others] and W = [ c1  cl−1  b  a  others]. Let M be the permutation c1 → c2 → . . . cm−2 →
c1. Let V1 = [a  b  others] and V2 = [b  a  others]. Let P =
⋃m−2
i=1 M
i(V1) ∪M i(V2). Let
P ∗ = 2P ′ ∪ {V,W}. It follows that a and b are the only two alternatives tied in the first place in
P ∗. Therefore, there exists  to satisfy the condition.
The same profile can be used to prove the local stability of all Condorcet consistent and monotonic
rules. 
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